Coalitional stability under perfect foresight
Coalitional stability under perfect foresight
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完美远见下的联盟稳定
DOI：
10.1007/s001990050204
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发表时间：
1998
期刊：
影响因子：
1.3
通讯作者：
Licun Xue
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Licun Xue
概括。我们分析战略社会环境，在这种环境中，可以通过有约束力或无约束力的协议形成联盟，并且联盟的行动可能会对其他参与者的福利施加外部性。我们定义了一个解决方案概念：(1) 捕捉文献中被忽视的参与者的完美远见（例如 Harsanyi [10] 和 Chwe [6]）；(2) 确定可能形成的联盟以及不会被任何理性（因此有远见的）参与者联盟所取代的“稳定”结果。因此，所提出的解决方案概念提供了复杂社会环境中协议和联盟形成的概念。
Summary. We analyze strategic social environments where coalitions can form through binding or nonbinding agreements and actions of a coalition may impose externalities upon the welfare of the rest of the players. We define a solution concept that (1) captures the perfect foresight of the players that has been overlooked in the literature (e.g., Harsanyi [10] and Chwe [6]) and (2) identifies the coalitions that are likely to form and the “stable” outcomes that will not be replaced by any coalition of rational (and hence farsighted) players. The proposed solution concept thereby offers a notion of agreements and coalition formation in complex social environments.
影响因子：
1.6
作者：
M. Chwe
通讯作者：
M. Chwe