Latent organizations in the film industry: Contracts, rewards and resources
Latent organizations in the film industry: Contracts, rewards and resources
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电影行业的潜在组织：合同、奖励和资源
DOI：
10.1177/0018726709335544
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发表时间：
2009
期刊：
影响因子：
5.7
通讯作者：
N. Wijnberg
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Joris J. Ebbers;N. Wijnberg
本文的主要目的是研究在何种程度上基于项目的组织（PBO）和潜在的组织决定在一个基于项目的行业中的演员的实际行为，以及这是如何介导的类型的合同和奖励的做法，这些组织形式允许。与PBO相关的劳动合同大多是交易性质的，而潜在组织的成员则通过关系合同联系在一起。对荷兰电影制片人的采访表明，与PBO相关的交易契约在管理参与者的实际行为方面不如与潜在组织相关的关系契约重要。在潜在组织中构建关系的关系契约允许灵活的奖励做法，就像在“正常”组织中一样。反过来，员工愿意通过提供资源来帮助组织处理环境的不确定性，而不坚持立即赔偿。
The main aim of this article is to study the extent to which the project-based organization (PBO) and the latent organization determine the actual behavior of actors in a project-based industry and how this is mediated by the types of contracts and rewarding practices these organizational forms allow. Labor contracts connected to the PBO are mostly transactional in nature, while the members of the latent organization are linked by relational contracts. Interviews with Dutch film producers show that the transactional contracts connected to the PBO are less important than the relational contracts connected to the latent organization in governing the actual behavior of the involved actors. Relational contracts that structure relationships in the latent organization allow flexible rewarding practices, just as in `normal' organizations. In turn, employees prove willing to assist the organization in handling environmental uncertainty by making resources available without insisting on immediate compensation.
影响因子：
8.3
作者：
Poppo, L;Zenger, T
通讯作者：
Zenger, T