Bid Anticipation, Information Revelation, and Merger Gains
Bid Anticipation, Information Revelation, and Merger Gains
复制标题
投标预期、信息披露和并购收益
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.2526312
复制
发表时间：
2017
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Wenyu Wang
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Wenyu Wang
由于公司的收购动机对投资者来说是不可观察的，因此合并只是部分预期，而且对收购者来说往往是喜忧参半。我构建并评估了一个模型来研究并购中投标预期和信息披露的原因和后果。控制市场对收购方独立价值的重新评估，我估计收购方从典型的合并中获得4%的收益。活跃的并购市场的总价值平均为收购方的13%，其中一部分在并购前的市场价值中资本化。我的模型还解释了公告回报和公司特征之间的相关性，以及合并的低可预测性。
Because firms’ takeover motives are unobservable to investors, mergers are only partially anticipated and often appear as mixed blessings for acquirers. I construct and estimate a model to study the causes and consequences of bid anticipation and information revelation in mergers. Controlling for the market’s reassessment of the acquirer’s stand-alone value, I estimate that acquirers gain 4% from a typical merger. The total value of an active merger market averages 13% for acquirers, part of which is capitalized in their pre-merger market values. My model also explains the correlation between announcement returns and firm characteristics, as well as the low predictability of mergers.
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.99580
发表时间：
1999-03
期刊：
The American Economic Review
影响因子：
--
作者：
Michael C. Jensen
通讯作者：
Michael C. Jensen