TARDIS: A Foundation of Time-Lock Puzzles in UC

TARDIS: A Foundation of Time-Lock Puzzles in UC
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TARDIS:加州大学时间锁定谜题的基础

DOI:
10.1007/978-3-030-77883-5_15
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发表时间:
2021
期刊:
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking
影响因子:
--
通讯作者:
Sabine Oechsner
Sabine Oechsner
中科院分区:
--
文献类型:
--
作者:
Carsten Baum;B. David;Rafael Dowsley;J. Nielsen;Sabine Oechsner

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基于时间的原语(如时间锁谜题(TLP))在实际协议中得到了广泛的使用,部分原因是人们对区块链空间的兴趣激增,在区块链空间中,TLP和相关原语被认为可以解决许多问题。不幸的是,安全性声明通常是不可靠的,或者是完全错误的,因为这些原语是在组合下使用的。一个原因是TLP本质上不是UC安全的,并且在UC模型中建模和使用时间是棘手的。另一方面,仅指定预期任务的独立概念,仅正确使用独立概念(如非延展性TLP),对于给定任务可能很难或不可能。即使在可能的情况下,独立的安全原语也很难在实践中安全地应用,因为它在组合下的行为不清楚。理想的解决方案将是UC框架中的TLP模型,以允许简单的模块化证明。在本文中,我们提供了一个基础,证明组合安全的实际协议使用的时间锁难题和相关的时间原语的UC模型。我们构造了基于随机预言机的UC安全TLP,并证明了使用随机预言机的必要性。为了证明安全性,我们提供了一种简单而抽象的方法来推理UC协议中的时间。最后,我们证明了这个基础的有用性,通过构建自己的权利,如UC安全的两方计算与输出无关的中止感兴趣的应用程序。?这项工作由欧洲研究理事会(ERC)根据欧盟地平线2020研究和创新计划资助,资助协议编号为669255(MPCPRO)。??这项工作得到了Concordium基金会、Protocol Labs资助SLEDGE和独立研究基金丹麦的支持,赠款号为9040- 00399 B(TrAC)和9131- 00075 B(CNOAA)。? ? ?这项工作是在Rafael Dowsley在Bar-Ilan大学工作期间完成的,并得到了BIU应用密码学和网络安全研究中心与以色列总理办公室国家网络局的支持。†由丹麦独立研究理事会资助,资助编号DFF-8021-
Time-based primitives like time-lock puzzles (TLP) are finding widespread use in practical protocols, partially due to the surge of interest in the blockchain space where TLPs and related primitives are perceived to solve many problems. Unfortunately, the security claims are often shaky or plainly wrong since these primitives are used under composition. One reason is that TLPs are inherently not UC secure and time is tricky to model and use in the UC model. On the other hand, just specifying standalone notions of the intended task, left alone correctly using standalone notions like non-malleable TLPs only, might be hard or impossible for the given task. And even when possible a standalone secure primitive is harder to apply securely in practice afterwards as its behavior under composition is unclear. The ideal solution would be a model of TLPs in the UC framework to allow simple modular proofs. In this paper we provide a foundation for proving composable security of practical protocols using time-lock puzzles and related timed primitives in the UC model. We construct UC-secure TLPs based on random oracles and show that using random oracles is necessary. In order to prove security, we provide a simple and abstract way to reason about time in UC protocols. Finally, we demonstrate the usefulness of this foundation by constructing applications that are interesting in their own right, such as UC-secure two-party computation with output-independent abort. ? This work was funded by the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Unions’ Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No 669255 (MPCPRO). ?? This work was supported by the Concordium Foundation, by Protocol Labs grant SLEDGE and by the Independent Research Fund Denmark with grants number 9040-00399B (TrAC) and number 9131-00075B (PUMA). ? ? ? This work was partially done while Rafael Dowsley was with Bar-Ilan University and was supported by the BIU Center for Research in Applied Cryptography and Cyber Security in conjunction with the Israel National Cyber Bureau in the Prime Minister’s Office. † Supported by the Danish Independent Research Council under Grant-ID DFF-8021-
不可延展的时间锁谜题和应用
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-90456-2_15
发表时间: 2021
期刊: TCC'21
影响因子: --
作者:
Cody Freitag;Ilan Komargodski;Rafael Pass;Naomi Sirkin
通讯作者: Naomi Sirkin