Targeting In-Kind Transfers through Market Design: A Revealed Preference Analysis of Public Housing Allocation
Targeting In-Kind Transfers through Market Design: A Revealed Preference Analysis of Public Housing Allocation
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通过市场设计瞄准实物转移：公共住房分配的揭示性偏好分析
DOI：
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发表时间：
2021
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
D. Waldinger
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
D. Waldinger
实物转移方案旨在向受益人提供宝贵的资源，同时针对那些最需要援助的人。这一问题对公共住房管理局（PHA）来说尤其具有挑战性，因为它们将公寓分配给可能在外部选择以及首选公寓类型方面有所不同的申请人。美国的PHAs在他们使用的优先系统以及他们给潜在租户在哪里居住的选择方面有很大的不同。本文评估了这些选择和优先系统如何影响两个相互竞争的目标：效率和再分配。我使用的公共住房申请人提交的选择的数据，估计在剑桥，MA的公共住房偏好的结构模型。我发现申请人的首选房屋发展和他们获得援助的价值观存在很大差异。反事实模拟表明，PHAs使用的机制范围涉及效率和再分配之间的巨大权衡。当申请人被允许选择他们的居住地时，租户每年享受相当于超过6，500美元现金转移的福利收益。取消选择将使申请者的外部选择更差，但匹配质量较低，导致成本调整后的福利收益下降30%。优先考虑低收入申请人，同时允许选择，将在不降低匹配质量的情况下改善目标定位。虽然选择和优先权的几种组合都处于效率和再分配的前沿，但一些常用的机制，如优先考虑高收入申请人而不允许选择，从来都不是最佳的。我非常感谢Nikhil Agarwal、Parag Pathak、Michael Whisper和Amy Finkelstein的宝贵指导和支持。本文受益于Zarek Brot-Goldberg、Alonso Bucarey、Sydnee考德威尔、Glenn Ellison、Chishio Furukawa、Andrey Fradkin、Colin Gray、Arda Gitmez的反馈，Ingrid Gould Ellen，Jonathan Gruber，Ray Kluender，Jacob Leshno，Benjamin马克思，Pooya Molavi，Anders Munk-Nielsen，斯科特纳尔逊，艾伦奥利维，克里斯蒂娜帕特森，奥蒂斯里德，南希罗斯，彭实，迈克尔斯特普纳，尼尔萨克拉尔，海蒂威廉姆斯，和Ariel Zucker，以及麻省理工学院工业组织和公共财政午餐会的研讨会参与者。剑桥住房管理局慷慨地提供了本文所用的申请人和租户数据，并特别感谢塔拉·奥布雄、蒂托埃武拉、迈克尔·约翰斯顿、杰伊·莱斯利、汉娜·洛迪和约翰·齐涅维奇。本文中所表达的所有分析和观点都是我自己的，并不代表剑桥房屋委员会的观点。[2]麻省理工学院经济学。电子邮件：dwalding@mit.edu。所有的错误都是我自己的。
In-kind transfer programs aim to provide valuable resources to beneficiaries while targeting those who most need assistance. This problem is particularly challenging for public housing authorities (PHAs), which allocate apartments to applicants who may differ in their outside options as well as their preferred apartment types. PHAs in the U.S. differ widely in the priority systems they use and how much choice they give potential tenants over where to live. This paper evaluates how these choice and priority systems affect two competing objectives: efficiency and redistribution. I use data on the submitted choices of public housing applicants to estimate a structural model of preferences for public housing in Cambridge, MA. I find substantial heterogeneity in applicants’ preferred housing developments and in their values of obtaining assistance. Counterfactual simulations suggest that the range of mechanisms used by PHAs involves a large trade-off between efficiency and redistribution. When applicants are allowed to choose where they live, tenants enjoy welfare gains equivalent to cash transfers of more than $6,500 per year. Removing choice would house applicants with worse outside options but provide low match quality, causing cost-adjusted welfare gains to fall by 30 percent. Prioritizing low-income applicants while allowing choice would improve targeting without lowering match quality. While several combinations of choice and priority are on the frontier of efficiency and redistribution, some commonly used mechanisms, such as prioritizing higher-income applicants without allowing choice, are never optimal. ∗I am very grateful to Nikhil Agarwal, Parag Pathak, Michael Whinston, and Amy Finkelstein for invaluable guidance and support. This paper benefited from feedback from Zarek Brot-Goldberg, Alonso Bucarey, Sydnee Caldwell, Glenn Ellison, Chishio Furukawa, Andrey Fradkin, Colin Gray, Arda Gitmez, Ingrid Gould Ellen, Jonathan Gruber, Ray Kluender, Jacob Leshno, Benjamin Marx, Pooya Molavi, Anders Munk-Nielsen, Scott Nelson, Alan Olivi, Christina Patterson, Otis Reid, Nancy Rose, Peng Shi, Michael Stepner, Neil Thakral, Heidi Williams, and Ariel Zucker, as well as seminar participants at the MIT Industrial Organization and Public Finance lunches. The Cambridge Housing Authority generously provided the applicant and tenant data used in this paper, with special thanks to Tara Aubuchon, Tito Evora, Michael Johnston, Jay Leslie, Hannah Lodi, and John Ziniewicz. All analysis and views expressed in this paper are my own and do not represent the views of the Cambridge Housing Authority. †MIT Economics. Email: dwalding@mit.edu. All mistakes are my own.
DOI：
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发表时间：
2015
期刊：
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影响因子：
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作者：
Raj Chetty;Nathaniel Hendren;Lawrence Katz
通讯作者：
Raj Chetty;Nathaniel Hendren;Lawrence Katz
影响因子：
10.7
作者：
Fack, Gabrielle;Grenet, Julien;He, Yinghua
通讯作者：
He, Yinghua