Black knights and elections in authoritarian regimes: Why and how Russia supports authoritarian incumbents in post-Soviet states
Black knights and elections in authoritarian regimes: Why and how Russia supports authoritarian incumbents in post-Soviet states
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黑骑士和独裁政权的选举：俄罗斯为何以及如何支持后苏联国家的独裁现任者
DOI：
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发表时间：
2015
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Jakob Tolstrup
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Jakob Tolstrup
在过去的十年里，研究记录了独裁者如何利用选举作为合法化和稳定政权的一种方式。与此同时，关于负面外部行为者（也被称为“黑骑士”）的文献已经发展起来，强调各种国际行为者如何使用反民主促进战略来巩固独裁政权。在这篇文章中，这两个文献被融合，试图揭示威权选举的外部维度和所谓的“黑骑士选举支持”。首先，阐明了五种机制，通过外部援助增加了在专制环境中“赢得”选举的机会（信号无敌，阻止精英叛逃，破坏反对派活动，处理民众抗议活动，并抵消来自外国民主推动者的压力）。其次，有人认为，外部行为者最有可能提供选举支持时，他们面对一个特别默许的合作伙伴，或当选举失败被认为是导致激进和不受欢迎的政权更迭。当选举结果的不确定性很高时，这两个因素的相关性就更大。最后，分析了俄罗斯在三个独裁邻国（2004年乌克兰，2006年白俄罗斯，2005年和2009年摩尔多瓦）选举期间的干预。案例研究证实了理论论点：俄罗斯不仅参与了所有五种类型的黑骑士选举支持，而且只有当三个解释因素中的一个或多个存在时，它才会这样做。
In the last decade, studies have documented how autocrats use elections as a way of legitimising and stabilising their regimes. Simultaneously, a literature on negative external actors (also known as ‘black knights’) has developed, emphasising how various international actors use anti-democracy promotion strategies to undergird authoritarian regimes. In this article, these two literatures are fused in an attempt to shed light on the external dimension of authoritarian elections and what is termed ‘black knight election bolstering’. First, five mechanisms are elucidated, through which external assistance increases the chances of ‘winning’ elections in authoritarian settings (signaling invincibility, deterring elite defection, undermining opposition activities, dealing with popular protests, and countervailing pressure from foreign democracy promoters). Second, it is argued that external actors are most likely to offer election bolstering when they face a particularly acquiescent partner or when electoral defeat is perceived to lead to radical and undesired regime change. The relevance of both factors is augmented when uncertainty of the electoral outcome is high. Finally, four cases of Russian intervention during elections in three authoritarian neighbour countries (Ukraine in 2004, Belarus in 2006, and Moldova in 2005 and 2009) are analysed. The case studies corroborate the theoretical arguments: not only does Russia engage in all five types of black knight election bolstering, but it does so only when one or more of the three explanatory factors are present.
威权团结的局限性：阿拉伯之春期间海湾君主国和维护威权统治
影响因子：
5.3
作者：
Odinius
通讯作者：
Odinius