Analysis of the risk-sharing ratio in PPP projects based on government minimum revenue guarantees
Analysis of the risk-sharing ratio in PPP projects based on government minimum revenue guarantees
复制标题
基于政府最低收入保障的PPP项目风险分担比例分析
DOI：
10.1016/j.ijproman.2018.01.007
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发表时间：
2018-08
影响因子：
8
通讯作者：
刘继才
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
王颖琳;崔鹏;刘继才
公私合作（PPP）项目在基础设施建设中得到广泛应用。适当的风险分配策略对于促进政府和投资者之间的谈判至关重要。政府通常向投资者提供担保以分散风险。然而，过多的担保增加了政府的财政负担，而不足的担保降低了参与项目的投资者的信心。在最低收入保证（MRG）中，如果出现亏损，政府将补贴投资者实际收入与政府保证线之间的差额。在PPP电站和公路项目中，投资者的收入来源有两个：政府担保和项目公司的自营销售。为支持项目公司，优化项目效益，政府应设定合理的采购金额基准。在传统的委托代理模型基础上，引入互惠偏好理论，分析最适合政府的风险分担比例。在此基础上，建立了保证项目收益的最优激励机制。研究结果表明，政府可以通过对不同的参与者设置不同的担保策略，利用互惠偏好激励投资者在合作过程中付出更多努力，避免道德风险。
Public-private partnership (PPP) projects have been widely applied in infrastructure construction. A suitable risk distribution strategy is crucial for promoting negotiations between the government and investors. The government usually provides guarantees to investors to distribute risk. However, an excessive guarantee increases the government's financial burden, whereas an insufficient guarantee reduces the confidence of the investors participating in the project. In a minimum revenue guarantee (MRG), the government subsidizes the investors the difference between the actual revenue and the government guarantee line if there is a loss. In PPP power plant and highway projects, investors' revenues come from two sources: government guarantees and the project company's self-sale. To support project companies and to optimize the projects' benefits, the government should set a reasonable benchmark for purchase amounts. Based on the traditional principal-agent model, this paper introduces the reciprocal preference theory to analyze the risk-sharing ratio most suitable for the government. Then, an optimal incentive mechanism is established to guarantee the project's income. The results indicate that by setting a different guarantee strategy for different participants, the government can utilize reciprocal preference to incentivize investors to exert more effort during a partnership and avoid moral hazard.
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影响因子：
8
作者：
Jicai Liu;Xibing Yu;C. Y. Cheah
通讯作者：
Jicai Liu;Xibing Yu;C. Y. Cheah
影响因子：
6.8
作者：
Shasha Shi;Yafeng Yin;Xiaolei Guo
通讯作者：
Shasha Shi;Yafeng Yin;Xiaolei Guo
DOI：
10.1257/aer.98.2.201
发表时间：
2008-04
期刊：
The American Economic Review
影响因子：
--
作者：
Canice Prendergast
通讯作者：
Canice Prendergast
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.1014030
发表时间：
2010-11
期刊：
Microeconomic Theory eJournal
影响因子：
--
作者：
Björn Bartling
通讯作者：
Björn Bartling
影响因子：
7.4
作者：
E. Osipova
通讯作者：
E. Osipova