Fair Ride Allocation on a Line
Fair Ride Allocation on a Line
复制标题
线路上的公平乘车分配
DOI:
10.1007/978-3-031-15714-1_24
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发表时间:
2022
期刊:
影响因子:
--
通讯作者:
Hirotaka Ono
中科院分区:
文献类型:
--
作者:
Yuki Amano;Ayumi Igarashi;Yasushi Kawase;Kazuhisa Makino;Hirotaka Ono
Imagine a group of travelers, each needing a taxi from the airport to their destination. For example, Alice may want to go directly to her hotel, while Bob prefers to head downtown to meet friends. Each traveler may ride a taxi alone or share a ride, potentially splitting into multiple groups to reduce the cost. This situation naturally raises two questions: how should coalitions be formed, and how should the taxi fare be fairly divided among the travelers? Many relevant aspects of the second problem have been explored within the framework of the classical airport problem, introduced by Littlechild and Owen [19]. In the airport problem, agents are linearly ordered by the size of their demands for a facility, and the total cost of using the facility is determined by the agent with the largest demand. In the context of sharing a taxi, the total fare is determined by the last agent to be dropped off. Although the problem originally refers to the division of the runway cost, it applies to a variety of real-life scenarios such as cost-sharing for an irrigation ditch [29], a shared meeting room over time, and a multi-user license with different pricing plans based on quality. The common property in all these examples is the linear structure of the agents’ demands.The airport problem is known to be one of the first successful applications of the celebrated Shapley value, which, despite its originally complex, exponential definition, has a simple and explicit expression in this context. Littlechild and Owen [19] showed that the sequential equal contributions rule, which applies equal division to each segment separately, coincides with the Shapley value. Consequently, the rule emerges as the unique efficient solution that satisfies the principle of “equal treatment of equals”(ie, if two agents within the same group make identical contributions, they should pay the same amount), along with several other desirable properties. 1
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DOI:
--
发表时间:
2019
期刊:
International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
影响因子:
--
作者:
M. Kyropoulou;Warut Suksompong;Alexandros A. Voudouris
通讯作者:
Alexandros A. Voudouris
DOI:
10.1007/978-3-319-71924-5_5
发表时间:
2017
期刊:
ArXiv
影响因子:
--
作者:
Omer Ben;Moshe Tennenholtz
通讯作者:
Moshe Tennenholtz
DOI:
10.1145/3219617.3219619
发表时间:
2018-03
期刊:
Abstracts of the 2018 ACM International Conference on Measurement and Modeling of Computer Systems
影响因子:
--
作者:
Siddhartha Banerjee;Yashodhan Kanoria;Pengyu Qian
通讯作者:
Siddhartha Banerjee;Yashodhan Kanoria;Pengyu Qian
影响因子:
1.1
作者:
Y. Chun;Cheng;Chun
通讯作者:
Chun
DOI:
10.1073/pnas.1611675114
发表时间:
2017-01-17
影响因子:
11.1
作者:
Alonso-Mora J;Samaranayake S;Wallar A;Frazzoli E;Rus D
通讯作者:
Rus D