Fair Ride Allocation on a Line

Fair Ride Allocation on a Line
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线路上的公平乘车分配

DOI:
10.1007/978-3-031-15714-1_24
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发表时间:
2022
期刊:
Lecture Notes in Computer Science
影响因子:
--
通讯作者:
Hirotaka Ono
Hirotaka Ono
中科院分区:
--
文献类型:
--
作者:
Yuki Amano;Ayumi Igarashi;Yasushi Kawase;Kazuhisa Makino;Hirotaka Ono

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想象一下一群旅行者,每个人都需要一辆出租车从机场到目的地。例如,爱丽丝可能想直接去她的酒店,而鲍勃更喜欢去市中心见朋友。每个旅行者可以单独乘坐一辆出租车,也可以共乘一辆,可能会分成多个小组,以降低成本。这种情况自然产生了两个问题:如何组成联盟,以及出租车费用应该如何在出行者之间公平分配?第二个问题的许多相关方面已经在Littlechild和Owen引入的经典机场问题的框架内进行了探索[19]。在机场问题中,代理商根据他们对设施的需求大小线性排序,使用设施的总成本由需求最大的代理商决定。在共乘一辆出租车的情况下,总车费由最后一个下车的代理人决定。尽管这个问题最初指的是跑道成本的划分,但它适用于各种现实生活场景,如灌溉沟渠的成本分担[29],随着时间的推移共享会议室,以及基于质量的不同定价计划的多用户许可证。所有这些例子的共同属性是代理人需求的线性结构。众所周知,机场问题是著名的Shapley值的最早成功应用之一,尽管它最初是复杂的指数定义,但在这种情况下有一个简单而明确的表达式。Littlechild和Owen[19]表明,顺序相等贡献规则,即分别对每一段应用相等的划分,与Shapley值一致。因此,该规则作为唯一有效的解决方案出现,它满足“平等对待”原则(即,如果同一组中的两个代理人做出相同的贡献,他们应该支付相同的金额),以及其他几个理想的性质。1
Imagine a group of travelers, each needing a taxi from the airport to their destination. For example, Alice may want to go directly to her hotel, while Bob prefers to head downtown to meet friends. Each traveler may ride a taxi alone or share a ride, potentially splitting into multiple groups to reduce the cost. This situation naturally raises two questions: how should coalitions be formed, and how should the taxi fare be fairly divided among the travelers? Many relevant aspects of the second problem have been explored within the framework of the classical airport problem, introduced by Littlechild and Owen [19]. In the airport problem, agents are linearly ordered by the size of their demands for a facility, and the total cost of using the facility is determined by the agent with the largest demand. In the context of sharing a taxi, the total fare is determined by the last agent to be dropped off. Although the problem originally refers to the division of the runway cost, it applies to a variety of real-life scenarios such as cost-sharing for an irrigation ditch [29], a shared meeting room over time, and a multi-user license with different pricing plans based on quality. The common property in all these examples is the linear structure of the agents’ demands.The airport problem is known to be one of the first successful applications of the celebrated Shapley value, which, despite its originally complex, exponential definition, has a simple and explicit expression in this context. Littlechild and Owen [19] showed that the sequential equal contributions rule, which applies equal division to each segment separately, coincides with the Shapley value. Consequently, the rule emerges as the unique efficient solution that satisfies the principle of “equal treatment of equals”(ie, if two agents within the same group make identical contributions, they should pay the same amount), along with several other desirable properties. 1
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