Recent work on human nature: Beyond traditional essences

Recent work on human nature: Beyond traditional essences
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关于人性的最新著作:超越传统本质

DOI:
10.1111/phc3.12159
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发表时间:
2014
期刊:
影响因子:
1.8
通讯作者:
Toepfer
Toepfer
中科院分区:
--
文献类型:
--
作者:
Kronfeldner;Roughley;Toepfer

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最近关于人性概念的哲学著作不同意如何回应达尔文的挑战,根据达尔文的挑战,生物物种没有传统的本质。可以区分出三种广泛的反应:(1)保守的内在本质主义,它捍卫传统意义上的本质;(2)消除主义,它建议完全放弃人性的概念;(3)建设性的方法,它认为修改可以产生超越传统本质的人性的合理概念。不同的建构方法从传统本质主义的人性观中融合的三种认识角色中挑选出一两种:描述性(描述性)、解释性(解释性)、定义性(分类关系主义)或解释性和定义性(属性群本质主义)。这些转向分歧的认识角色最好解释多元化:有多种人性的概念,必须明确区分,每一个在各自的科学背景下的合法作用。
Recent philosophical work on the concept of human nature disagrees on how to respond to the Darwinian challenge, according to which biological species do not have traditional essences. Three broad kinds of reactions can be distinguished: (1)conservative intrinsic essentialism, which defends essences in the traditional sense, (2)eliminativism, which suggests dropping the concept of human nature altogether, and (3)constructive approaches, which argue that revisions can generate sensible concepts of human nature beyond traditional essences. The different constructive approaches pick out one or two of the three epistemic roles that are fused in traditional essentialist conceptions of human nature: descriptive (descriptivism), explanatory (explanativism), definitional (taxonomic relationalism), or explanatory and definitional (property cluster essentialism). These turns towards diverging epistemic roles are best interpreted pluralistically: there is a plurality of concepts of human nature that have to be clearly distinguished, each with a legitimate role in respective scientific contexts.
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