Efficient dynamic mechanisms in environments with interdependent valuations: the role of contingent transfers
Efficient dynamic mechanisms in environments with interdependent valuations: the role of contingent transfers
复制标题
相互依存估值环境中的有效动态机制：或有转移的作用
DOI：
10.3982/te2234
复制
发表时间：
2018
影响因子：
1.7
通讯作者：
Heng Liu
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Heng Liu
本文讨论的问题，实施社会有效的分配在动态环境中相互依存的估值和不断发展的私人信息。在代理人的信息是跨时间相关的情况下，我们构建了有效的和激励相容的直接动力机制。与现有文献中具有历史独立转移的机制不同，这些机制具有历史依赖转移的特征。此外，他们让人想起经典的VCG机制，即使后者是不激励兼容的相互依存的估值。我们进一步表明，VCG方面的直接机制，建议自然的方式在一些重复拍卖的实施。
This paper addresses the problem of implementing socially efficient allocations in dynamic environments with interdependent valuations and evolving private information. In the case where the agents' information is correlated across time, we construct efficient and incentive compatible direct dynamic mechanisms. Unlike the mechanisms with history-independent transfers in the existing literature, these mechanisms feature history-dependent transfers. Moreover, they are reminiscent of the classical VCG mechanism, even though the latter is not incentive compatible with interdependent valuations. We further show that the VCG aspect of the direct mechanisms suggests natural ways for implementation in some repeated auctions.
事后实施的局限性
影响因子：
6.1
作者：
Jehiel;Philippe;Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehn;Benny Moldovanu;William R. Zame
通讯作者：
William R. Zame