The psychology of moral reasoning
The psychology of moral reasoning
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道德推理心理学
DOI：
--
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发表时间：
2008
影响因子：
2.5
通讯作者：
P. Johnson
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
M. Bucciarelli;S. Khemlani;P. Johnson
本文提出了一个理论的推理道德命题是基于四个基本原则。首先，没有简单的标准可以从关于社会关系、法律、游戏和礼仪中什么是允许的和不允许的道义命题的更大集合中挑选出有关道德的命题。第二，情感和道义评价的机制是独立的，并且是并行运作的，因此有些情景在道德评价之前引发情感，有些情景在情感之前引发道德评价，有些情景同时引发情感和道义评价。第三，道义评价依赖于推理，无论是无意识的直觉还是有意识的推理。第四，人类关于什么是道德，什么不是道德的信念既不完整也不一致。文章整理了证据，其中包括新的研究，证实这些原则，并讨论了它们之间的关系和其他当前的道德推理理论。
This article presents a theory of reasoning about moral propositions that is based on four fundamental principles. First, no simple criterion picks out propositions about morality from within the larger set of deontic propositions concerning what is permissible and impermissible in social relations, the law, games, and manners. Second, the mechanisms underlying emotions and deontic evaluations are independent and operate in parallel, and so some scenarios elicit emotions prior to moral evaluations, some elicit moral evaluations prior to emotions, and some elicit them at the same time. Third, deontic evaluations depend on inferences, either unconscious intuitions or conscious reasoning. Fourth, human beliefs about what is, and isn’t, moral are neither complete nor consistent. The article marshals the evidence, which includes new studies, corroborating these principles, and discusses the relations between them and other current theories of moral reasoning.
影响因子：
5.4
作者：
J. Haidt
通讯作者：
J. Haidt