Defending against Thru-barrier Stealthy Voice Attacks via Cross-Domain Sensing on Phoneme Sounds
Defending against Thru-barrier Stealthy Voice Attacks via Cross-Domain Sensing on Phoneme Sounds
复制标题
通过音素声音的跨域感知防御穿墙隐形语音攻击
DOI:
10.1109/icdcs54860.2022.00071
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发表时间:
2022
期刊:
影响因子:
--
通讯作者:
Chen, Yingying
中科院分区:
文献类型:
--
作者:
Shi, Cong;Zhao, Tianming;Zhang, Wenjin;Mahdad, Ahmed Tanvir;Ye, Zhengkun;Wang, Yan;Saxena, Nitesh;Chen, Yingying
The open nature of voice input makes voice assistant (VA) systems vulnerable to various acoustic attacks (e.g., replay and voice synthesis attacks). A simple yet effective way for adversaries to launch these attacks is to hide behind barriers (e.g., a wall, a window, or a door) and give unauthorized voice commands without being observed by legitimate users. In this work, we develop an automated, training-free defense system that can protect VA systems from such thru-barrier acoustic attacks. Our study finds that acoustic signals passing through the barriers generally present a unique frequency-selective effect in the vibration domain. Thus, we propose to devise a system to capture this unique effect of barriers by leveraging low-cost, cross-domain sensing available in users’ wearables. The system replays the audio-domain signals with the wearable’s speaker and captures the conductive vibrations caused by the audio sounds in the vibration domain via the built-in accelerometer. To improve the proposed system’s reliability, we develop a unique vibration-domain enhancement method to extract the phonemes most sensitive to the frequency-selective effect of barriers. We identify effective vibration-domain features that capture the barriers’ effects in the vibration domain. A 2D-correlation-based method is developed to examine the speech similarity between the recordings from the VA system and the user’s wearable and detect thru-barrier attacks. Extensive experiments with various barriers and environments demonstrate that the proposed defense system can effectively defend random, replay, synthesis, and hidden voice attacks with less than 4% equal error rates.
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DOI:
10.1109/icccn49398.2020.9209697
发表时间:
2020-08
期刊:
2020 29th International Conference on Computer Communications and Networks (ICCCN)
影响因子:
--
作者:
Cong Shi;Xiaonan Guo;Ting Yu;Yingying Chen;Yucheng Xie;Jian Liu
通讯作者:
Cong Shi;Xiaonan Guo;Ting Yu;Yingying Chen;Yucheng Xie;Jian Liu
DOI:
--
发表时间:
2007
期刊:
International Conference on Biometrics
影响因子:
--
作者:
T. Kinnunen;Bingjun Zhang;Jia Zhu;Ye Wang
通讯作者:
Ye Wang
DOI:
--
发表时间:
2016
期刊:
Asia Pacific Conference on Circuits and Systems
影响因子:
--
作者:
Po;C. Yeh;H. Tsai;Y. Juang
通讯作者:
Y. Juang
DOI:
10.1145/3427228.3427259
发表时间:
2020-12
期刊:
Proceedings of the 36th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference
影响因子:
--
作者:
Cong Shi;Yan Wang;Yingying Chen;Nitesh Saxena;Chen Wang
通讯作者:
Cong Shi;Yan Wang;Yingying Chen;Nitesh Saxena;Chen Wang
DOI:
--
发表时间:
2004
期刊:
海外事情研究(熊本学園大学海外事情研究所) 第32巻第1巻
影响因子:
--
作者:
丁 鋒;丁 鋒;丁 鋒;丁 鋒;丁 鋒;丁鋒;丁鋒
通讯作者:
丁鋒