Effects of Patent Protection on Optimal Corporate Income and Consumption Taxes in an R&D‐Based Growth Model
Effects of Patent Protection on Optimal Corporate Income and Consumption Taxes in an R&D‐Based Growth Model
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基于研发的增长模型中专利保护对最优企业收入和消费税的影响
DOI：
10.1002/soej.12161
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发表时间：
2016
影响因子：
1.9
通讯作者：
Tatsuro Iwaisako
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Tatsuro Iwaisako
降低企业所得税并增加消费税以满足政府的预算约束，是否能改善福利？为此，我们以政府预算在各时点均达到平衡为约束条件，考察了R& D增长模型中福利最大化的企业所得税和消费税税率。此外，我们考虑如何福利最大化的税率变化的专利保护变得更强，在许多国家。结果表明，专利保护力度越大，企业所得税税率越高，消费税税率越低。这意味着，在加强专利保护的情况下，通过提高企业所得税和降低消费税，以牺牲创新为代价恢复生产，可以提高福利。
Does reducing the corporate income tax accompanied by an increase in the consumption tax to meet the government's budget constraint improve welfare? To respond, we examine the welfare-maximizing corporate income tax and consumption tax rates in an R&D-based growth model under the constraint that the government's budget is balanced at each point of time. Further, we consider how welfare-maximizing tax rates change as patent protection becomes stronger, as seen in many countries. The results show that as patent protection becomes stronger, the corporate income tax rate should be higher and the consumption tax rate should be lower. This implies that under stronger patent protection, recovering production at the expense of innovation by raising corporate income tax and reducing consumption tax improves welfare.
影响因子：
1.7
作者：
Ryo Horii;Tatsuro Iwaisako
通讯作者：
Ryo Horii;Tatsuro Iwaisako