Knowledge-how, Understanding-why and Epistemic Luck: an Experimental Study
Knowledge-how, Understanding-why and Epistemic Luck: an Experimental Study
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知识如何、理解为什么和认知运气：一项实验研究
DOI：
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发表时间：
2019
影响因子：
2
通讯作者：
Joshua Shepherd
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
J. Carter;Duncan Pritchard;Duncan Pritchard;Joshua Shepherd;Joshua Shepherd
关于知识如何的还原知识主义者（如Stanley & Williamson哲学学报1998,411-44,2001;Stanley no<s:1> s 45, 207-38, 2011a, 2011b； Brogaard哲学指南3,93-118,2008a； Grazer哲学研究77,147-90,2008b；哲学与现象学研究78,439-67,2009,2011）与赖尔（1946,1949）相反，认为知道如何做某件事只是一种命题知识。同样，关于理解为什么的传统还原主义者（如Salmon, 1984; Lipton, 2004; Woodward, 2003; Grimm, The British Journal for The Philosophy of Science, 57,515 - 35,2006; Greco, 2009; Kelp, 2014）坚持认为，根据从亚里士多德开始的传统，当一个人理解为什么某事是这样时，他所获得的认知论地位本身就是一种命题知识。，原因的命题知识。争论双方都同意的一点是，如果这些简化的建议是正确的，那么知识——如何和理解——为什么在同样的程度上应该是易受影响的——这将被认识论的运气所破坏。本文报告了测试这些基于运气的预测的实验结果。有趣的是，这些结果表明，自我报告的哲学专业知识与知识归因（如何）、理解（为什么）和知识（与简化建议相反）之间存在显著（尽管不完美）的正相关。我们通过展示它们如何与特定类型的总体非还原建议非常一致来将这些结果纳入背景，其中两位作者在其他地方为其辩护（例如，Carter和Pritchard哲学与现象学研究91,181 - 99,2015 a, no<s:1>第49,44,53,2015 b，澳大利亚哲学季刊93,799 - 816,2015 c）根据知识-如何和理解-为什么，而不是知识-本质上涉及认知成就(即，认知的成功主要归功于认知能力)。最后，我们将在关于哲学判断中的专家作用的当代讨论中提出解释性叙述。
Reductive intellectualists about knowledge-how (e.g., Stanley & Williamson Journal of Philosophy 98, 411–44, 2001; Stanley Noûs 45, 207–38, 2011a, 2011b; Brogaard Philosophy Compass 3, 93–118, 2008a, Grazer Philosophische Studien 77, 147–90 2008b, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78, 439–67 2009, 2011) hold, contra Ryle (1946, 1949), that knowing how to do something is just a kind of propositional knowledge. In a similar vein, traditional reductivists about understanding-why (e.g., Salmon 1984; Lipton 2004; Woodward 2003; Grimm The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57, 515–35, 2006; Greco 2009; Kelp 2014) insist, in accordance with a tradition beginning with Aristotle, that the epistemic standing one attains when one understands why something is so is itself just a kind of propositional knowledge—viz., propositional knowledge of causes. A point that has been granted on both sides of these debates is that if these reductive proposals are right, then knowledge-how and understanding-why should be susceptible to the same extent as knowledge-that is to being undermined by epistemic luck. This paper reports experimental results that test these luck-based predictions. Interestingly, these results suggest a striking (albeit, imperfect) positive correlation between self-reported philosophical expertise and attributions of knowledge-how, understanding-why and knowledge-that which run contrary to reductive proposals. We contextualize these results by showing how they align very well with a particular kind of overarching non-reductive proposal, one that two of the authors have defended elsewhere (e.g., Carter and Pritchard Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91, 181–99, 2015a, Noûs 49, 440–53, 2015b, Australasian Philosophical Quarterly 93, 799–816, 2015c) according to which knowledge-how and understanding-why, but not knowledge-that, essentially involve cognitive achievement (i.e., cognitive success that is primarily creditable to cognitive ability). We conclude by situating the interpretive narrative advanced within contemporary discussions about the role of expertise in philosophical judgment.
DOI：
10.1017/s1358246109000046
发表时间：
2009-01-01
期刊：
EPISTEMOLOGY
影响因子：
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作者：
Pritchard, Duncan
通讯作者：
Pritchard, Duncan