Modeling potential responses to smallpox as a bioterrorist weapon.
Modeling potential responses to smallpox as a bioterrorist weapon.
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DOI：
10.3201/eid0706.010607
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发表时间：
2001-11
影响因子：
11.8
通讯作者：
Millar JD
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Meltzer MI;Damon I;LeDuc JW;Millar JD
我们建立了一个数学模型来描述在故意释放病毒后天花的传播。假设最初有100人感染，每个感染者有3人感染，单靠隔离就可以阻止疾病传播，但需要每天至少清除50%有明显症状的人。只有当疾病传播减少到或= 33%时，疫苗接种才能在释放后365天内阻止疫情<0.85 persons infected per infectious person. A combined vaccination and quarantine campaign could stop an outbreak if a daily quarantine rate of 25% were achieved and vaccination reduced smallpox transmission by >。在这种情况下，将出现大约4,200例病例，需要365天才能阻止疫情爆发。历史数据表明，为阻止疫情爆发，每个病例接种的天花疫苗剂量中位数为2 155剂，这意味着4 000万剂的库存应该足够。
We constructed a mathematical model to describe the spread of smallpox after a deliberate release of the virus. Assuming 100 persons initially infected and 3 persons infected per infectious person, quarantine alone could stop disease transmission but would require a minimum daily removal rate of 50% of those with overt symptoms. Vaccination would stop the outbreak within 365 days after release only if disease transmission were reduced to <0.85 persons infected per infectious person. A combined vaccination and quarantine campaign could stop an outbreak if a daily quarantine rate of 25% were achieved and vaccination reduced smallpox transmission by > or = 33%. In such a scenario, approximately 4,200 cases would occur and 365 days would be needed to stop the outbreak. Historical data indicate that a median of 2,155 smallpox vaccine doses per case were given to stop outbreaks, implying that a stockpile of 40 million doses should be adequate.
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影响因子：
--
作者：
ARITA, I;WICKETT, J;FENNER, F
通讯作者：
FENNER, F
影响因子：
11.8
作者：
O'Toole, T
通讯作者：
O'Toole, T
DOI：
10.2307/2343186
发表时间：
1960-01-01
期刊：
JOURNAL OF THE ROYAL STATISTICAL SOCIETY SERIES A-GENERAL
影响因子：
--
作者：
BARTLETT, MS
通讯作者：
BARTLETT, MS
影响因子：
11.8
作者：
Henderson, DA
通讯作者：
Henderson, DA
影响因子：
2.3
作者：
Cliff, A D;Haggett, P
通讯作者：
Haggett, P