Corporate Governance and Audit Fees: Evidence of Countervailing Relations
Corporate Governance and Audit Fees: Evidence of Countervailing Relations
复制标题
公司治理和审计费用：反补贴关系的证据
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.1069480
复制
发表时间：
2008
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Estelle Y. Sun
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
P. Griffin;D. Lont;Estelle Y. Sun
这项研究证明，审计费用、审计质量和治理反映了两种反补贴关系，即由于预期负债的外部变化而导致的费用增加，这需要更多的审计和其他机制来实现更好的治理，以及费用的降低，因为审计师降低了风险价格，以反映更好的治理的好处。研究期间为检验这些关系提供了一个有趣的背景，因为它涵盖了萨班斯-奥克斯利法案的通过，该法案给许多公司加强治理带来了巨大成本，包括增加审计和内部控制支出。然而，在控制了这种增加的支出后，我们的结果也表明，更好的治理降低了审计成本。
This study documents that audit fees, and hence audit quality, and governance reflect two countervailing relations, namely, a fee increase because of exogenous changes in expected liability that require greater auditing and other mechanisms to attain better governance, and a fee reduction because auditors reduce the price of risk to reflect the benefits of better governance. The study period provides an interesting setting to test these relations because it covers the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley legislation, which imposed a substantial cost on many companies to strengthen governance, including increased auditing and internal control spending. Yet, after controlling for such increased spending, our results also suggest that better governance reduces the cost of auditing.
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.485403
发表时间：
2004-10
期刊：
Financial Accounting
影响因子：
--
作者：
D. Farber
通讯作者：
D. Farber