Persuasion with Coarse Communication
Persuasion with Coarse Communication
复制标题
通过粗略沟通进行说服
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.3540677
复制
发表时间：
2019
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
E. Turkel
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Yunus C. Aybas;E. Turkel
说服是一项极其困难的任务。这种困难的主要原因是偏好的错位，这是说服游戏的文献广泛研究。然而，沟通的困难也有一个一阶效应的结果和福利的代理。出于这一观察，我们研究了贝叶斯说服模型，其中发送者和接收者之间的通信受到限制。我们将信号空间的基数限制为小于动作空间和状态空间的基数。这限制了发送者做出任意多个动作建议的能力。我们证明了发送者的效用最大化问题的解决方案的存在性，并描述其性质。在解决这个问题，我们开发了一种新的方法来解决贝叶斯说服问题，它可以应用于广泛的设置。我们的特征发送者愿意支付额外的信号作为一个功能的先验信念，我们解释为精确的通信的价值。我们表明，增加精度可能并不总是福利改善显示接收器可能更喜欢粗糙的通信。
Persuasion is an exceedingly difficult task. A leading cause of this difficulty is the misalignment of preferences, which is studied extensively by the literature on persuasion games. However, the difficulty of communication also has a first order effect on outcomes and welfare of agents. Motivated by this observation, we study a model of Bayesian persuasion in which the communication between the sender and the receiver is constrained. We limit the cardinality of the signal space to be less than the cardinality of the action space and the state space. This limits the sender's ability of making arbitrarily many action recommendations. We prove the existence of a solution to the sender's utility maximization problem and characterize its properties. In solving this problem, we develop a novel approach for solving Bayesian persuasion problems, which can be applied to a wide range of settings. We characterize the sender's willingness to pay for an additional signal as a function of the prior belief, which we interpret as the value of precise communication. We show that increased precision might not be always welfare improving by showing that the receiver might prefer coarse communication.
影响因子：
8.2
作者：
Sobel, Joel
通讯作者：
Sobel, Joel