CONFIDENCE IN BELIEFS AND RATIONAL DECISION MAKING

CONFIDENCE IN BELIEFS AND RATIONAL DECISION MAKING
复制标题

对信念和理性决策的信心

DOI:
--
复制
发表时间:
2017
影响因子:
1.2
通讯作者:
Brian Hill
Brian Hill
中科院分区:
人文科学2区
文献类型:
--
作者:
Brian Hill

文献摘要

参考文献

被引文献

相似文献

摘要:理性信念和决策的标准贝叶斯解释经常被认为无法正确处理严重的不确定性,这种不确定性在某些政策制定领域无处不在。本文讨论了用什么来取代它作为理性决策的指南的问题。它为最近的一项提议辩护,该提议为决策者对信念的信心保留了一定的作用。除了能够应对严重的不确定性之外,该账户在通常被认为与理性信念和决策相关的主要战线上拥有强大的规范资质。我们认为,与文献中其他著名的非贝叶斯模型相比,它的表现特别好。
Abstract: The standard, Bayesian account of rational belief and decision is often argued to be unable to cope properly with severe uncertainty, of the sort ubiquitous in some areas of policy making. This paper tackles the question of what should replace it as a guide for rational decision making. It defends a recent proposal, which reserves a role for the decision maker’s confidence in beliefs. Beyond being able to cope with severe uncertainty, the account has strong normative credentials on the main fronts typically evoked as relevant for rational belief and decision. It fares particularly well, we argue, in comparison to other prominent non-Bayesian models in the literature.
做出气候决策
DOI: 10.1111/phc3.12259
发表时间: 2015
期刊: Philosophy Compass
影响因子: 1.8
作者:
Bradley R
通讯作者: Bradley R
DOI: 10.1086/684184
发表时间: 2022
影响因子: 1.7
作者:
Bradley S
通讯作者: Bradley S