Solving the Crowdsourcing Dilemma Using the Zero-Determinant Strategies

Solving the Crowdsourcing Dilemma Using the Zero-Determinant Strategies
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使用零决定性策略解决众包困境

DOI:
10.1109/tifs.2019.2949440
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发表时间:
2020
影响因子:
6.8
通讯作者:
Bie Rongfang
Bie Rongfang
中科院分区:
计算机科学1区
文献类型:
--
作者:
Hu Qin;Wang Shengling;Cheng Xiuzhen;Ma Liran;Bie Rongfang

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众包是一种很有前途的技术,可以通过从大量贡献者那里获取服务来完成复杂的任务。最近的观察表明,众包的成功受到了贡献者恶意行为的威胁。在本文中,我们使用迭代囚徒困境(IPD)博弈来分析攻击问题,并提出一种基于零行列式(ZD)策略的奖惩预期收益算法,以奖励工人的合作或惩罚其背叛,以吸引最终的合作。进行了理论分析和仿真研究,结果表明该算法具有以下两个有吸引力的特点:1)请求者可以激励工人合作,而无需任何长期额外成本; 2)所提出的算法是公平的,因此请求者不能任意惩罚无辜的工人以增加其收益,即使它可以主导游戏。据我们所知,我们是第一个采用ZD策略来刺激双方玩家在IPD游戏中合作的。此外,我们提出的算法不仅限于解决众包困境问题 - 它可以用来解决任何可以制定为 IPD 游戏的问题。
Crowdsourcing is a promising technology to accomplish a complex task via eliciting services from a large group of contributors. Recent observations indicate that the success of crowdsourcing has been threatened by the malicious behaviors of the contributors. In this paper, we analyze the attack problem using an iterated prisoner’s dilemma (IPD) game and propose a reward-penalty expected payoff algorithm based on zero-determinant (ZD) strategies to reward a worker’s cooperation or penalize its defection in order to entice the final cooperation. Both theoretical analysis and simulation studies are performed, and the results indicate that the proposed algorithm has the following two attractive characteristics: 1) the requestor can incentivize the worker to become cooperative without any long-term extra cost; and 2) the proposed algorithm is fair so that the requestor cannot arbitrarily penalize an innocent worker to increase its payoff even though it can dominate the game. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to adopt the ZD strategies to stimulate both players to cooperate in an IPD game. Moreover, our proposed algorithm is not restricted to solve only the problem of crowdsourcing dilemma - it can be employed to tackle any problem that can be formulated into an IPD game.
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