Scientific Realism
Scientific Realism
复制标题
科学实在论
DOI：
10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199368815.013.30
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发表时间：
2017
影响因子：
1.7
通讯作者：
T. Lyons
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
T. Lyons
本文试图找出两个主要论点对认识论科学实在论的最强版本：历史的论点，通常被称为“悲观元归纳”-和从不充分决定的论点。它表明，与文献相反，两者都可以理解为历史上知情，但逻辑validmodus tollensarguments。在说明了与欠确定性相关的问题并说明了为什么经验等价是不必要的之后，确定了当代科学理论的两种竞争者，这两种竞争者都是由科学本身所告知的。随着这两种非实在论论点的内容和结构的澄清，它们之间的新颖关系被揭示出来，揭示了它们对认识实在论及其“无奇迹”论点的集体威胁的严重性。然而，最后一节提出，现实主义者的价值论宗旨“科学寻求真理”并没有被封锁。试图表明一个nonepistemic的，纯粹的价值论科学实在论的承诺，在这里被称为“苏格拉底的科学实在论。”
This article endeavors to identify the strongest versions of the two primary arguments against epistemic scientific realism: the historical argument—generally dubbed “the pessimistic meta-induction”—and the argument from underdetermination. It is shown that, contrary to the literature, both can be understood as historically informed but logically validmodus tollensarguments. After specifying the question relevant to underdetermination and showing why empirical equivalence is unnecessary, two types of competitors to contemporary scientific theories are identified, both of which are informed by science itself. With the content and structure of the two nonrealist arguments clarified, novel relations between them are uncovered, revealing the severity of their collective threat against epistemic realism and its “no-miracles” argument. The final section proposes, however, that the realist’s axiological tenet “science seeks truth” is not blocked. An attempt is made to indicate the promise for a nonepistemic, purely axiological scientific realism—here dubbed “Socratic scientific realism.”
趋同现实主义的对抗
影响因子：
1.7
作者：
Vickers P
通讯作者：
Vickers P
当经验的成功意味着理论参考时：结构对应定理
DOI：
10.1093/bjps/axn049
发表时间：
2009
期刊：
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
影响因子：
--
作者：
Schurz
通讯作者：
Schurz