The Flexible Few: Oligarchs and Wealth Defense in Developing Democracies
The Flexible Few: Oligarchs and Wealth Defense in Developing Democracies
复制标题
灵活的少数：发展中民主国家的寡头和财富保卫
DOI：
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发表时间：
2017
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Volha Charnysh
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
S. Markus;Volha Charnysh
基于乌克兰寡头个人的原始大N数据集和定性证据，本文测试了对大资本政治权力的竞争观点。令人惊讶的是，我们发现，无论是寡头假设直接权力，还是寡头资产的流动性，都无助于大亨们保护自己的财富免受冲击。相反，政党支持和媒体所有权的间接策略大大增加了商业财富。从经验上讲，我们通过研究2006年至2012年177名寡头的政治和经济活动来分析后共产主义寡头。在理论上，我们对资本的工具性和结构性权力，以及极端财富，法治和民主之间的相互作用的文献做出了贡献。在这样做的时候，我们对比了灵活性的逻辑，根据这一逻辑，寡头们从政治适应性和可否认性中受益，而承诺补偿的逻辑，根据这一逻辑，当法治薄弱时，寡头们从直接权力中受益。
Based on an original large-N dataset of individual Ukrainian oligarchs and qualitative evidence, this article tests competing perspectives on the political power of big capital. We find, surprisingly, that neither the assumption of direct power by the oligarchs nor the mobility of oligarchic assets helps tycoons protect their fortunes against shocks. Instead, the indirect strategies of party support and media ownership significantly enhance business wealth. Empirically, we profile postcommunist oligarchs by examining the political and economic activities of 177 oligarchs from 2006 to 2012. Theoretically, we contribute to the literatures on instrumental and structural power of capital, and on the interactions between extreme wealth, rule of law, and democracy. In doing so, we contrast the logic of flexibility, according to which oligarchs benefit from political adaptability and deniability, with the logic of commitment compensation, according to which oligarchs benefit from direct power when the rule of law is weak.
DOI：
10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199214273.003.0023
发表时间：
2010
期刊：
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影响因子：
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作者：
Moon J
通讯作者：
Moon J