Egoistic punishment outcompetes altruistic punishment in the spatial public goods game.
Egoistic punishment outcompetes altruistic punishment in the spatial public goods game.
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在空间公共物品博弈中，利己惩罚胜过利他惩罚
DOI：
10.1038/s41598-021-85814-1
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发表时间：
2021-03-22
影响因子：
4.6
通讯作者：
Xia H
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Li J;Liu Y;Wang Z;Xia H
由于合作者的二阶搭便车行为，代价高昂的惩罚的演化是一个难题。先前的研究提出了许多解决方案，主要集中在降低惩罚成本或直接或间接惩罚二阶搭便车者。我们试图从惩罚动机的角度来解释这一困惑，即惩罚者为何愿意付出代价。答案是惩罚者是利己的。利己性惩罚旨在保护惩罚者自身被背叛者分享的合作利益。在这种情况下，利己的惩罚者会在惩罚背叛者时付出代价，并从背叛者那里挽回损失的收益。在此，我们研究了利己性惩罚的演化和表现，并使用经典的同侪惩罚和公共惩罚模式将其与典型的利他性惩罚进行比较。结果表明，无论是在均匀混合的群体还是结构化群体中，无论是通过同侪惩罚还是公共惩罚模式，利己性惩罚都能在较大的参数范围内演化并有效促进合作。这一结果对于不同的策略更新规则也是稳健的。公共惩罚机制下的演化更为复杂。由于循环支配，参数的影响是违反直觉的；即成本是控制合作水平的关键因素，罚款决定了惩罚者和合作者的比例。与利他性惩罚相比，利己性惩罚能在较低罚款和较高成本的区域促进合作，尤其是在公共惩罚模式下，并且利己的惩罚者具有更强的生存能力。利己的惩罚者代表了社会系统中的自然公平。结果显示，关注个体公平能显著促进集体合作。这项研究为代价高昂的惩罚的演化提供了另一种解释。
The evolution of costly punishment is a puzzle due to cooperators’ second-order free-riding. Previous studies have proposed many solutions mainly focused on reducing the punishment cost or punishing second-order free riders directly or indirectly. We attempt to explain this confusion from the perspective of punishment motivation, which is why the punisher is willing to pay the cost. The answer is that the punisher is egoistic. Egoistic punishment aims to protect punishers’ own cooperative benefits shared by the defectors. In such case, egoistic punishers would pay a cost in punishing defectors and retrieve lost payoffs from defectors. Here, we examined the evolution and performance of egoistic punishment and compared it with typical altruistic punishment using classic peer-punishment and pool-punishment modes. Results showed egoistic punishment can evolve and effectively promote cooperation within a large parameter range, whether in a well-mixed or structured population, or through peer-punishment or pool-punishment modes. This result is also robust to different strategy-updating rules. The evolution under the pool-punishment mechanism is more complicated. The influence of parameters is counter-intuitive because of cycle dominance; namely, the cost is the key factor to control the level of cooperation and the fine determines the ratio of the punishers and cooperators. Compared with altruistic punishment, egoistic punishment can promote cooperation in a lower-fine and higher-cost area, especially in the pool punishment mode, and the egoistic punishers have stronger survivability. Egoistic punishers represent the natural fairness in a social system. Results revealed that focusing on individual equity can significantly promote collective cooperation. This study provides another explanation for the evolution of costly punishment.
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影响因子：
4.2
作者：
Crockett, Molly J.;Clark, Luke;Lieberman, Matthew D.;Tabibnia, Golnaz;Robbins, Trevor W.
通讯作者：
Robbins, Trevor W.
影响因子：
4.6
作者：
Huang F;Chen X;Wang L
通讯作者：
Wang L
影响因子：
56.9
作者：
Gachter, Simon;Renner, Elke;Sefton, Martin
通讯作者：
Sefton, Martin
影响因子：
29.3
作者：
Guala, Francesco
通讯作者：
Guala, Francesco
影响因子：
2
作者：
Johnson, Tim;Dawes, Christopher T.;Smirnov, Oleg
通讯作者：
Smirnov, Oleg