Non-monetary coordination mechanisms for time slot allocation in warehouse delivery
Non-monetary coordination mechanisms for time slot allocation in warehouse delivery
复制标题
仓交时隙分配的非货币协调机制
DOI：
10.1016/j.ejor.2020.03.068
复制
发表时间：
2020
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Minner
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Karaenke;Bichler;Merting;Minner
最近的经验证据表明，向零售仓库送货存在缺乏协调的问题。虽然航空公司试图优化他们的航线，但他们经常在装货码头经历非常长的等待时间，这使得他们的个人规划毫无用处。为了减少这种低效，运营商需要进行协调。这个问题在实践中得到了相当大的关注，但协调机制的设计具有挑战性，原因有几个：首先，潜在的包裹分配问题是NP-Hard问题。其次，效率、激励相容和公平是重要的设计要求，但在大多数经济环境中，它们是相互冲突的。第三，物流服务市场竞争激烈，基于价格的机制，运营商可能不得不为时段付费，但接受度较低。我们借鉴了市场设计方面的最新进展，更具体地说，是随机匹配机制，它为运营商设定了诚实共享信息的激励措施，以便中央实体能够以公平和近似有效的方式协调他们的计划。我们使用并调整现有的最大化基数效用(MAXCU)框架来解决零售物流问题，这产生了一种新的强大的协调方法。我们报告了基于真实物流网络的现场数据的数值实验，分析了该机制在等待时间和所需计算时间方面的平均减少，并与先到先得和拍卖机制进行了比较。我们的结果表明，随机匹配机制提供了一种有效的手段来减少仓库的等待时间，而不需要运营商进行资金转移。它们以多项式的时间运行，为广泛的协调问题提供了一种实用的解决方案。
Recent empirical evidence suggests that delivery to retail warehouses suffers from a lack of coordination. While carriers try to optimize their routes, they often experience very long waiting times at loading docks, which renders their individual planning useless. To reduce such inefficiencies, carriers need to coordinate. This problem has received considerable attention in practice, but the design of coordination mechanisms is challenging for several reasons: First, the underlying package assignment problem is NP-hard. Second, efficiency, incentive-compatibility, and fairness are important design desiderata, but in most economic environments they are conflicting. Third, the market for logistics services is competitive and price-based mechanisms where carriers might have to pay for time slots suffer from low acceptance. We draw on recent advances in market design, more specifically randomized matching mechanisms, which set incentives for carriers to share information truthfully such that a central entity can coordinate their plans in a fair and approximately efficient way. We use and adapt the existing maximizing cardinal utilities (MAXCU) framework to a retail logistics problem, which yields a new and powerful approach for coordination. We report numerical experiments based on field data from a real-world logistics network to analyze the average reduction in waiting times and the computation times required and compare to first-come, first-served and an auction mechanism. Our results show that randomized matching mechanisms provide an effective means to reduce waiting times at warehouses without requiring monetary transfers by the carriers. They run in polynomial time and provide a practical solution to wide-spread coordination problems.
频谱拍卖设计手册
DOI：
--
发表时间：
2017
期刊：
影响因子：
--
作者：
M. Bichler;J. Goeree
通讯作者：
J. Goeree
市场设计回顾
DOI：
10.1145/3406678.3406683
发表时间：
2020
期刊：
ACM SIGACT News
影响因子：
--
作者：
M. Bichler;S. V. Nagaraj
通讯作者：
S. V. Nagaraj
DOI：
10.7551/mitpress/9780262033428.003.0020
发表时间：
2005
期刊：
Econometrics: Econometric & Statistical Methods - Special Topics eJournal
影响因子：
--
作者：
Kevin Leyton;Nudelman Eugene;Y. Shoham
通讯作者：
Y. Shoham