Information avoidance and overvaluation under epistemic constraints: Principles and implications for regulatory policies
Information avoidance and overvaluation under epistemic constraints: Principles and implications for regulatory policies
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认知约束下的信息规避和高估：监管政策的原则和影响
DOI：
10.1016/j.ress.2020.106814
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发表时间：
2020
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Minca, Andreea
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Pozzi, Matteo;Malings, Carl;Minca, Andreea
信息价值（VoI）评估数据在决策过程中的影响。一个风险中性的代理人，用货币来量化VoI，倾向于只在他们的VoI超过收集数据的成本时才收集数据。对于没有外部约束的代理来说，数据具有非负的VoI（因为自由的“信息不会造成伤害”），而那些对代理信念具有几乎可以忽略的潜在影响的数据具有几乎可以忽略的VoI。然而，这些直观的性质并不适用于在与认知量相关的外部约束下行动的代理，例如由一些规则构成的约束。例如，当资产的故障概率过高时，经理被迫修复资产，他可能更倾向于避免收集有关资产实际状况的免费信息，甚至为了避免这种情况而付费，或者她可以为几乎不相关的数据分配高VoI。因此，通过在法规中施加认知约束，政策制定者可以在遵守法规的代理人中诱导一系列反直觉但理性的行为，从信息回避到对几乎不相关的信息的过度评估。本文阐述了VoI的结构属性如何根据这些外部认知约束而变化，并讨论了激励和惩罚如何缓解这些诱导的信息态度。
The Value of Information (VoI) assesses the impact of data in a decision process. A risk-neutral agent, quantifying the VoI in monetary terms, prefers to collect data only if their VoI surpasses the cost to collect them. For an agent acting without external constraints, data have non-negative VoI (as free “information cannot hurt”) and those with an almost-negligible potential effect on the agent's belief have an almost-negligible VoI. However, these intuitive properties do not hold true for an agent acting under external constraints related to epistemic quantities, such as those posed by some regulations. For example, a manager forced to repair an asset when its probability of failure is too high can prefer to avoid collecting free information about the actual condition of the asset, and even to pay in order to avoid this, or she can assign a high VoI to almost-irrelevant data. Hence, by enforcing epistemic constraints in the regulations, the policy-maker can induce a range of counter-intuitive, but rational, behaviors, from information avoidance to over-evaluation of barely relevant information, in the agents obeying the regulations.This paper illustrates how the structural properties of VoI change depending on such external epistemic constraints, and discusses how incentives and penalties can alleviate these induced attitudes toward information.
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