Capital Structure as an Optimal Contract Between Employees and Investors
Capital Structure as an Optimal Contract Between Employees and Investors
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资本结构作为员工和投资者之间的最优契约
DOI：
10.1111/j.1540-6261.1992.tb04008.x
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发表时间：
1992
影响因子：
8
通讯作者：
Chun Chang
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Chun Chang
投资者与员工之间的事前最优契约是内生的，并从债务、股权和员工薪酬的角度进行解释。虽然在该模式下，通过会计确认的收益，公开股权融资是可行的，但在收益实现之前，需要债务来强制进行价值提升型重组。然而，最优债务水平低于企业价值最大化时，有非货币重组相关的成本，员工。这篇论文解释了股票价格如何对交易所的报价做出反应，收益如何被杠杆率的降低所稀释，以及为什么员工的索赔要求通常优先于投资者。新的可测试的影响，杠杆和补偿水平。版权所有1992年美国金融协会。
The ex ante optimal contract between investors and employees is derived endogenously and is interpreted in terms of debt, equity, and employees' compensation. Although public equity financing is feasible in this model through verified accounting income, debt is needed to force value-enhancing restructuring before the income realizes. The optimal debt level, however, is lower than that which maximizes the value of the firm when there is nonmonetary restructuring-related cost to employees. The paper explains how stock prices react to exchange offers, how earnings can be diluted by a decrease in leverage, and why employees' claims are generally senior to those of investors. New testable implications about leverage and compensation levels are derived. Copyright 1992 by American Finance Association.
影响因子：
4
作者：
Douglas Gale;M. Hellwig
通讯作者：
Douglas Gale;M. Hellwig