Do students behave like real taxpayers in the lab? Evidence from a real effort tax compliance experiment

Do students behave like real taxpayers in the lab? Evidence from a real effort tax compliance experiment
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学生在实验室里的行为是否像真正的纳税人?

DOI:
10.1016/j.jebo.2015.09.015
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发表时间:
2016
影响因子:
2.2
通讯作者:
Choo C
Choo C
中科院分区:
经济学3区
文献类型:
--
作者:
Choo C

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我们报告的数据来自一个实际努力的税收合规实验,使用三个主题池:学生,谁不缴纳所得税;公司员工,其收入由雇主报告;和自雇纳税人,谁负责申报和支付。虽然合规行为不受审计概率水平或有关审计概率信息的变化的影响,但更高的罚款会提高合规性。我们发现主题池的差异:自我评估的纳税人是最遵守,而学生是最不遵守。通过简单的框架操作,我们表明这种差异是由实验室外部的合规规范驱动的。
We report on data from a real-effort tax compliance experiment using three subject pools: students, who do not pay income tax; company employees, whose income is reported by their employer; and self-employed taxpayers, who are responsible for filing and payment. While compliance behavior is unaffected by changes in the level of, or information about the audit probability, higher fines increase compliance. We find subject pool differences: self-assessed taxpayers are the most compliant, while students are the least compliant. Through a simple framing manipulation, we show that such differences are driven by norms of compliance from outside the lab.
DOI: 10.1515/roe-2014-0203
发表时间: 2014
影响因子: --
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