Impacts of regional governmental incentives on the straw power industry in China: A game-theoretic analysis
Impacts of regional governmental incentives on the straw power industry in China: A game-theoretic analysis
复制标题
地方政府激励对中国秸秆发电产业的影响：博弈论分析
DOI：
10.1016/j.jclepro.2018.08.149
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发表时间：
2018-12
影响因子：
11.1
通讯作者：
P. Zhou
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Wen Wen;P. Zhou
中国秸秆发电产业从一开始就面临原料短缺的问题。一些地方政府建议对秸秆交易活动的农民或经纪人提供价格激励。本文旨在评估这些激励措施的影响，并探索最大限度地发挥潜在积极作用的可行方法。构建了我国典型秸秆供应链成员的非合作博弈模型和合作博弈模型。的均衡决策，收益和社会效益的推导和分析比较，而数值实验的测试分析结果和扩展潜在的讨论。研究发现，激励措施不仅可以提高秸秆交易量，而且有利于秸秆供应链成员和社会。同时，无论经纪人还是农户作为接受者，其激励效果都是相同的。然而，在不合作的情况下，经纪人可能有更大的议价能力，并从农民那里获得更多的补贴利益。秸秆发电厂与中间商合作，补贴可以平均分配，产生更高的社会效益。此外，当农民对货币敏感度较高时，补贴可能会更好地发挥作用。建议地方政府在秸秆交易活动中对农户或经纪人提供价格激励，促进秸秆发电厂与经纪人的合作。特别是，政府应该在相对贫困的地区施加更多的激励措施，因为农民往往对货币更加敏感。
China's straw power industry has been suffering from feedstock deficiency since the very beginning. Some local governments propose to offer price incentives to farmers or brokers on straw transaction activities. This paper aims to evaluate the impacts of such incentives and explore feasible ways for maximizing the potential positive effects. Both non-cooperative and cooperative game models are constructed for the members in a typical straw supply chain of China. The equilibrium decisions, payoffs, and social benefits are derived and compared analytically, while numerical experiments are set up for testing the analytical results and extending potential discussions. It is found that the incentives could not only enhance the straw transaction volume, but also benefit the straw supply chain members and the society. Meanwhile, the incentive effects are equal regardless of whether brokers or farmers act as the recipients. However, brokers may have larger bargaining power and grab more subsidizing benefits from farmers in the non-cooperative case. When the straw power plant works cooperatively with brokers, the subsidies may be shared equally and induce higher social benefits. In addition, the subsidies may work better when farmers have higher monetary sensitivity. It is thus suggested that the local governments should offer price incentives to either farmers or brokers on straw transaction activities and facilitate the cooperation between straw power plants and brokers. In particular, the governments should exert more incentive effort in relatively poor regions where farmers tend to be more monetary sensitive.
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影响因子：
11.1
作者：
Yunna Wu;Lingwenying Li;Ruhang Xu;Kaifeng Chen;Yong Hu;Xiaoshan Lin
通讯作者：
Yunna Wu;Lingwenying Li;Ruhang Xu;Kaifeng Chen;Yong Hu;Xiaoshan Lin
中国木薯生物乙醇供应链运作与协调建模
影响因子：
9
作者：
Ye Fei;Li Yina;Lin Qiang;Zhan Yuanzhu;Li YN;Lin Q
通讯作者：
Lin Q
影响因子：
9
作者：
Changbo Wang;Lixiao Zhang;Yuan Chang;Mingyue Pang
通讯作者：
Changbo Wang;Lixiao Zhang;Yuan Chang;Mingyue Pang
DOI：
--
发表时间：
2017
期刊：
--
影响因子：
--
作者：
Amanda Sosa;M. Acuna;K. McDonnell;Ger J. Devlin;Ger J. Devlin;“Controlling Moisture;Publisher Elsevier-Publisher-E
通讯作者：
Amanda Sosa;M. Acuna;K. McDonnell;Ger J. Devlin;Ger J. Devlin;“Controlling Moisture;Publisher Elsevier-Publisher-E
影响因子：
11.1
作者：
A.B.M. Abdul Malek;Md. Hasanuzzaman;N. Rahim;Yusuf A. Al Turki
通讯作者：
A.B.M. Abdul Malek;Md. Hasanuzzaman;N. Rahim;Yusuf A. Al Turki