Core-selecting package auctions: a comment on revenue-monotonicity
Core-selecting package auctions: a comment on revenue-monotonicity
复制标题
核心选择包拍卖：对收入单调性的评论
DOI：
10.1007/s00182-009-0188-z
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发表时间：
2010
影响因子：
0.6
通讯作者：
L. Lamy
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
L. Lamy
Day 和 Milgrom (Int J Game Theory 36:393–407, 2008) 认为，在核心中选择卖方最低收入的打包拍卖是收入单调的。我们表明，当至少有三种商品可供出售时，任何投标人最优的核心选择拍卖都不能满足一般偏好的收入单调性，而在只有两种商品的环境中或如果特征函数是子模的，则该属性适用于任何投标人最优的核心选择拍卖。
Day and Milgrom (Int J Game Theory 36:393–407, 2008) argue that package auctions that select the seller’s minimum revenue in the Core are revenue-monotone. We show that no bidder-optimal Core-selecting auction can satisfy revenue-monotonicity for general preferences when there are at least three goods for sale, while the property holds for any bidder-optimal Core-selecting auction in environments with only two goods or if the characteristic function is submodular.
影响因子：
0.6
作者：
Robert W. Day;Paul R. Milgrom
通讯作者：
Robert W. Day;Paul R. Milgrom