Discovering Opportunities in New York City's Discovery Program: Disadvantaged Students in Highly Competitive Markets
Discovering Opportunities in New York City's Discovery Program: Disadvantaged Students in Highly Competitive Markets
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在纽约市的探索计划中发现机会：高度竞争的市场中的弱势学生
DOI：
10.1145/3580507.3597762
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发表时间：
2023
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Zhang, Xuan
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Faenza, Yuri;Gupta, Swati;Zhang, Xuan
发现计划（Discovery Program，简称DISC）是纽约市教育部（NYC DOE）为增加来自低社会经济背景的学生进入专业高中的人数而制定的一项政策。这项政策有助于增加这些学校中处境不利学生的人数。然而，假设学生更关心他们被分配到的学校，而不是他们占据的座位类型（学校座位假说），我们使用最近12个学年的数据进行的实证分析表明，DISC每年在弱势学生中创建约950个组内阻塞对，每年影响约650名弱势学生。此外，我们发现，该计划不尊重改进，从而无意中创造了激励表现不佳。理论分析证实了实验结果。为了缓解DISC引起的担忧，我们探讨了两种替代政策：少数席位储备（MR）和联合席位分配（JSA）机制。作为我们的主要理论贡献，我们介绍了市场的一个特点，我们长期的高竞争力，我们表明，在这种条件下，JSA占主导地位的MR所有弱势学生。我们给出了充分的条件下，高竞争力的验证。来自纽约能源部的数据满足高竞争力条件，对于这个数据集，我们的实证结果证实了我们的理论预测，显示了JSA的优越性。鉴于JSA可以通过简单修改经典的延迟接受算法与响应偏好列表来实现，我们相信，当学校座位假设成立时，发现程序可以通过实施JSA机制来改变，特别是对表现最好的弱势学生的激励措施。
Discovery program (DISC) is a policy used by the New York City Department of Education (NYC DOE) to increase the number of admissions of students from low socio-economic background to specialized high schools. This policy has been instrumental in increasing the number of disadvantaged students attending these schools. However, assuming that students care more about the school they are assigned to rather than the type of seat they occupy (\emph{school-over-seat hypothesis}), our empirical analysis using data from 12 recent academic years shows that DISC creates about 950 in-group blocking pairs each year amongst disadvantaged students, impacting about 650 disadvantaged students every year. Moreover, we find that this program does not respect improvements, thus unintentionally creating an incentive to under-perform. These experimental results are confirmed by our theoretical analysis. In order to alleviate the concerns caused by DISC, we explore two alternative policies: the minority reserve (MR) and the joint-seat allocation (JSA) mechanisms. As our main theoretical contribution, we introduce a feature of markets, that we term high competitiveness, and we show that under this condition, JSA dominates MR for all disadvantaged students. We give sufficient conditions under which high competitiveness is verified. Data from NYC DOE satisfies the high competitiveness condition, and for this dataset our empirical results corroborate our theoretical predictions, showing the superiority of JSA. Given that JSA can be implemented by a simple modification of the classical deferred acceptance algorithm with responsive preference lists, we believe that, when the school-over-seat hypothesis holds, the discovery program can be changed for the better by implementing the JSA mechanism, leading in particular to aligned incentives for the top-performing disadvantaged students.
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