Ambiguity in Performance Pay: An Online Experiment
Ambiguity in Performance Pay: An Online Experiment
复制标题
绩效工资的模糊性：在线实验
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.2268633
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发表时间：
2013
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
David Johnson
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
D. Cooper;David Johnson
许多激励计划本质上是模糊的，缺乏绩效和薪酬之间的明确映射。使用一个在线劳动力市场，亚马逊土耳其机械，我们研究了模糊性的影响，愿意接受合同做一个真正的努力任务，以及完成和执行这项任务。绩效和薪酬之间关系的模糊性会影响个人接受合同的意愿和在完成之前辞职的可能性，但不会影响绩效。这些影响在歧义水平上是非单调的。关于任务能力的信息降低了接受的意愿，增加了放弃，但不影响绩效。
Many incentive plans are inherently ambiguous, lacking an explicit mapping between performance and compensation. Using an online labor market, Amazon Mechanical Turk, we study the effect of ambiguity on willingness to accept contracts to do a real-effort task as well as completion and performance of this task. Ambiguity about the relationship between performance and compensation affects the willingness of individuals to accept contracts and the likelihood of quitting before completion, but not performance. These effects are non-monotonic in the level of ambiguity. Information about ability at the task reduces willingness to accept and increases quitting, but does not affect performance.
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.2109698
发表时间：
2012-06
期刊：
ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Policies & Processes (Topic)
影响因子：
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作者：
David Gill;Victoria Prowse;Michael Vlassopoulos
通讯作者：
David Gill;Victoria Prowse;Michael Vlassopoulos