Fisher—General Motors and the Nature of the Firm*
Fisher—General Motors and the Nature of the Firm*
复制标题
费舍尔——通用汽车和公司的性质*
DOI：
10.1086/467449
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发表时间：
2000
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
B. Klein
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
B. Klein
在良好运作了5年多之后，由于通用汽车对费雪车身的需求出人意料地急剧增加，该公司与通用汽车（GM）的车身供应合同破裂。这将双方之间不完善的合同安排推到了自我执行范围之外，并导致Fisher利用了通用汽车在合同上有义务以成本加成的方式购买车身的事实。由于未能按照通用汽车的要求，对位于密歇根州弗林特的通用汽车生产设施附近的一家工厂进行投资，费舍尔增加了短期利润。垂直整合，以及通用汽车向费雪支付相关的侧付款，是解决这一合同拖延问题的方法。对Fisher - GM案例的考察说明了垂直整合在避免长期合同刚性成本方面的作用。
After working well for more than 5 years, the Fisher Body—General Motors (GM) contract for the supply of automobile bodies broke down when GM's demand for Fisher's bodies unexpectedly increased dramatically. This pushed the imperfect contractual arrangement between the parties outside the self‐enforcing range and led Fisher to take advantage of the fact that GM was contractually obligated to purchase bodies on a cost‐plus basis. Fisher increased its short‐term profit by failing to make the investments required by GM in a plant located near GM production facilities in Flint, Michigan. Vertical integration, with an associated side payment from GM to Fisher, was the way in which this contractual hold‐up problem was solved. This examination of the Fisher‐GM case illustrates the role of vertical integration in avoiding the rigidity costs of long‐term contracts.
影响因子：
2.2
作者：
M. Sako;S. Helper
通讯作者：
M. Sako;S. Helper