Horizontal Mergers in the Presence of Network Externalities
Horizontal Mergers in the Presence of Network Externalities
复制标题
网络外部性存在下的横向合并
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.3461769
复制
发表时间：
2020
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Susumu Sato
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Susumu Sato
评估网络效应和双面性是数字经济中并购控制的关键。
为了考察网络效应对并购福利属性的影响，本研究利用聚合博弈方法分析了具有企业层面直接和间接网络外部性的多产品企业寡头垄断模型。分析表明，网络外部性通过网络扩张增加了兼并的消费者收益，同时也增加了伴随市场力量的成本。前者为涉及小公司的合并提供了正当理由，但后者使占主导地位的公司之间的合并更有可能损害消费者。在双边市场中，并购对消费者剩余的影响取决于并购各方并购前的价格结构。特别是，当一个消费群体通过并购方的双边定价得到补贴时，这类消费者可能会从合并中受益。这些结果为平台并购政策提供了理论指导。
Evaluating network effects and two-sidedness is critical for merger control in the digital economy.
To examine the impact of network effects on the welfare properties of mergers, this study analyzes a model of multiproduct-firm oligopoly with firm-level direct and indirect network externalities using an aggregative-games approach. The analysis shows that network externalities increase both the consumer benefits of mergers through network expansion and the cost of accompanying market power. The former justifies mergers involving small firms, but the latter makes mergers between dominant firms more likely to hurt consumers. In two-sided markets, the effect of mergers on consumer surplus depends on merging parties' pre-merger price structures. In particular, when a consumer group is subsidized through two-sided pricing by merging parties, such consumers are likely to benefit from mergers. These results provide theoretical guidance on merger policy toward platforms.
DOI：
10.1016/j.jet.2019.104990
发表时间：
2017-08
期刊：
CEPR Discussion Paper Series
影响因子：
--
作者：
Simon P. Anderson;M. Peitz
通讯作者：
Simon P. Anderson;M. Peitz
影响因子：
8.2
作者：
Volker Nocke;M. Whinston
通讯作者：
Volker Nocke;M. Whinston