Privatization, Underpricing and Welfare in the Presence of Foreign Competition
Privatization, Underpricing and Welfare in the Presence of Foreign Competition
复制标题
外国竞争下的私有化、定价过低和福利
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.2235358
复制
发表时间：
2013
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
B. Saha
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
A. Ghosh;Manipushpak Mitra;B. Saha
我们分析了国内上市公司和国外利润最大化公司在差异化寡头垄断环境下的私有化。我们特别研究了上市公司低于边际成本的定价、最优私有化程度以及私有化与外资所有权限制之间的关系。当市场结构是外生的，公共企业的部分私有化通过减少公共部门的损失来改善福利。令人惊讶的是，即使在最理想的私有化水平上，上市公司的价格也严格低于边际成本，从而导致亏损。我们的分析还揭示了短期内私有化和投资自由化（即放松对外资所有权的限制）之间的潜在冲突。在内生市场结构（即外国公司自由进入）下，部分私有化通过增加外国品种这一额外渠道改善了福利。此外，在最优私有化水平下，上市公司的价格严格高于边际成本，并获得正利润。
We analyze privatization in a differentiated oligopoly setting with a domestic public firm and foreign profit-maximizing firms. In particular, we examine pricing below marginal cost by the public firm, the optimal degree of privatization, and the relationship between privatization and foreign ownership restrictions. When market structure is exogenous, partial privatization of the public firm improves welfare by reducing public sector losses. Surprisingly, even at the optimal level of privatization, the public firm's price lies strictly below marginal cost, resulting in losses. Our analysis also reveals a potential conflict between privatization and investment liberalization (i.e., relaxing restrictions on foreign ownership) in the short run. With endogenous market structure (i.e., free entry of foreign firms), partial privatization improves welfare through an additional channel: more foreign varieties. Furthermore, at the optimal level of privatization, the public firm's price lies strictly above marginal cost and earns positive profits.
影响因子：
1.7
作者：
Toshihiro Matsumura;O. Kanda
通讯作者：
Toshihiro Matsumura;O. Kanda
影响因子：
1.7
作者：
K. Fujiwara
通讯作者：
K. Fujiwara
影响因子：
1.7
作者：
Matsumura, Toshihiro;Matsushima, Noriaki;Ishibashi, Ikuo
通讯作者：
Ishibashi, Ikuo