Stochastic coalitional better-response dynamics and stable equilibrium
Stochastic coalitional better-response dynamics and stable equilibrium
复制标题
随机联盟更好的响应动态和稳定平衡
DOI：
10.1134/s0005117916120110
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发表时间：
2016
影响因子：
0.7
通讯作者：
Vikas Vikram Singh
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Konstantin Avrachenkov;Vikas Vikram Singh
我们考虑无限域上n人有限策略博弈中局中人之间的联盟形成。每次随机形成的联盟都与当前动作简档产生联合偏差，使得在新的动作简档中，来自联盟的所有玩家都严格受益。这种偏差定义了一个联盟更好的响应（CBR）的动态，一般是随机的。CBR动态要么收敛到K稳定平衡，要么陷入封闭循环。我们还假设，在每一次选定的联盟作出错误的偏差与小概率添加突变（扰动）到CBR动态。我们证明了具有最小随机势的所有K稳定平衡和来自闭循环的所有作用曲线都是随机稳定的。类似的陈述对于严格K稳定均衡也成立。我们应用CBR动力学来研究突变存在下网络的动态形成。在CBR动力学下，所有强稳定网络和网络的闭环都是随机稳定的。
We consider coalition formation among players in an n-player finite strategic game over infinite horizon. At each time a randomly formed coalition makes a joint deviation from a current action profile such that at new action profile all the players from the coalition are strictly benefited. Such deviations define a coalitional better-response (CBR) dynamics that is in general stochastic. The CBR dynamics either converges to a K-stable equilibrium or becomes stuck in a closed cycle. We also assume that at each time a selected coalition makes mistake in deviation with small probability that add mutations (perturbations) into CBR dynamics. We prove that all K-stable equilibria and all action profiles from closed cycles, that have minimum stochastic potential, are stochastically stable. Similar statement holds for strict K-stable equilibrium. We apply the CBR dynamics to study the dynamic formation of the networks in the presence of mutations. Under the CBR dynamics all strongly stable networks and closed cycles of networks are stochastically stable.
影响因子：
1.4
作者：
Fudenberg, Drew;Nowak, Martin A.;Imhof, Lorens A.
通讯作者：
Imhof, Lorens A.