Value and Fitting Emotions
Value and Fitting Emotions
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价值和合适的情感
DOI：
10.1007/s10790-008-9134-8
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发表时间：
2008
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Brady M
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Brady M
关于价值的感伤主义认为“道德或评价性概念或属性在某种程度上取决于人类的情感。理性感伤主义认为，人类的情感受制于某种特定的理性评估，并对这种评估作出反应，道德或评价概念取决于在这个意义上是理性的情感。在最近的一些有趣而重要的论文中，贾斯汀·达姆斯和丹尼尔·雅各布森认为，理性感伤主义的著名版本面临着一个严重的问题，并建议如何发展一种评价概念和属性的感伤主义方法，以避免这种困难。[2]然而，D'Arms和Jacobson的建议本身就受到批评，理由是由此产生的叙述似乎是循环的。因此，我们不清楚是否有充分的理由更喜欢达姆斯和雅各布森提出的理性感伤主义，而不是其他著名的感伤主义者的叙述。
Sentimentalism about value is the view that" moral or evaluative concepts or properties depend somehow on human sentiments." Rational sentimentalism is the view that human sentiments are subject to and responsive to a particular kind of rational assessment, and that moral or evaluative concepts depend upon sentiments that are rational in this sense. In a number of interesting and important recent papers, Justin D'Arms and Daniel Jacobson have argued that well-known versions of rational sentimentalism face a serious problem, and have suggested how a sentimentalist approach to evaluative concepts and properties needs to be developed in order to avoid this difficulty. 2 However, D'Arms and Jacobson's suggestion is itself open to criticism, on the ground that the resulting account appears to be circular. As such, it is not clear that we have good reason to prefer the rational sentimentalism proposed by D'Arms and Jacobson to other well-known sentimentalist accounts.
恶魔来袭：论亲和价值观的契合*
DOI：
--
发表时间：
2004
期刊：
Ethics: An International Journal of Social, Political, and Legal Philosophy
影响因子：
--
作者：
Wlodek Rabinowicz;T. Rønnow
通讯作者：
T. Rønnow
影响因子：
64.8
作者：
B. Davis
通讯作者：
B. Davis