Many-to-Many Matching and Price Discrimination ⇤
Many-to-Many Matching and Price Discrimination ⇤
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多对多匹配和价格歧视⇤
DOI：
10.3982/te1904
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发表时间：
2016
影响因子：
1.7
通讯作者：
A. Pavan
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Renato Gomes;A. Pavan
我们研究了集中式多对多匹配的市场，代理商有私人信息（垂直）的特点，确定匹配值。我们的分析揭示了匹配模式如何反映双方之间的交叉补贴。代理人内生地分为消费者和投入，在最优解时，代理人投入的成本由代理人消费者的收益补偿。我们展示了如何通过匹配规则，有一个简单的阈值结构，并在弱序（集包含）的意义上是强制性的，可以实现这样的交叉补贴。然后，我们提供可测试的预测有关的最佳匹配规则和价格表的代理人的特征的分布。该分析对大型匹配中介机构的设计具有影响，例如广告交易所，企业对企业平台和在线工作匹配机构。
We study centralized many-to-many matching in markets where agents have private information about (vertical) characteristics that determine match values. Our analysis reveals how matching patterns reflect cross-subsidization between sides. Agents are endogenously partitioned into consumers and inputs .A t the optimum, the costs of procuring agents-inputs are compensated by the gains from agents-consumers. We show how such cross-subsidization can be achieved through matching rules that have a simple threshold structure and are assortative in the weak-order (set inclusion) sense. We then deliver testable predictions relating the optimal matching rules and price schedules to the distribution of the agents’ characteristics. The analysis has implications for the design of large matching intermediaries, such as advertising exchanges, business-to-business platforms, and online job-matching agencies.
DOI：
10.1111/j.1467-937x.2008.00517.x
发表时间：
2005-12
期刊：
Macroeconomics eJournal
影响因子：
--
作者：
Heidrun C. Hoppe-Wewetzer;B. Moldovanu;A. Sela
通讯作者：
Heidrun C. Hoppe-Wewetzer;B. Moldovanu;A. Sela