The Impact of Monitoring and Sanctions on Cheating: Experimental Evidence from Tunisia
The Impact of Monitoring and Sanctions on Cheating: Experimental Evidence from Tunisia
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监控和制裁对作弊的影响：来自突尼斯的实验证据
DOI：
10.1002/mde.2731
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发表时间：
2016
影响因子：
2.2
通讯作者：
A. Sutan
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Insaf Bekir;S. Harbi;G. Grolleau;Naoufel Mzoughi;A. Sutan
利用在一个发展中国家(突尼斯、北非)的实验室实验，我们调查了监督水平以及制裁的性质(金钱和道德)和力度是否会影响作弊水平。我们的发现表明，引入薄弱的货币制裁和监管可能会增加作弊行为。然而，一个完美的监控被发现可以降低作弊的水平。此外，当与完美的监督相结合时，道德制裁很重要，在减少作弊方面甚至可能比强有力的货币制裁更有效。我们得出了一些关于不同领域作弊的政策含义。(此摘要是从本项目的另一个版本借来的。)
Using a laboratory experiment in a developing country (Tunisia, North Africa), we investigate whether the level of monitoring and both the nature (monetary versus moral) and magnitude of sanctions influence cheating levels. Our findings show that the introduction of weak monetary sanctions and monitoring is likely to increase cheating. However, a perfect monitoring is found to decrease the level of cheating. Moreover, when combined with a perfect monitoring, moral sanctions matter and may be even more effective than strong monetary sanctions in reducing cheating. We draw some policy implications regarding cheating in various domains. (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
影响因子：
3.6
作者：
Fischbacher, Urs;Foellmi-Heusi, Franziska
通讯作者：
Foellmi-Heusi, Franziska