Monopolistic group design with peer effects
Monopolistic group design with peer effects
复制标题
具有同伴效应的垄断群体设计
DOI：
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发表时间：
2009
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Simon Board
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Simon Board
在一系列环境中，私营企业通过将代理人分为不同的群体来管理同行效应，无论是学校、社区还是产品类别。本文考虑了这样一个公司，它通过设定一系列匿名价格来控制集团进入。我们表明，私人提供系统地导致两个扭曲相对于有效的解决方案：第一，代理人被隔离得太细;第二，太多的代理人被排除在所有群体之外。我们证明，这些扭曲是匿名定价的后果，并不依赖于同行效应的性质。这种一般的方法也使我们能够评估的方式的“规模回报”的同行技术和成本组的形成影响最佳的组结构。
In a range of settings, private firms manage peer effects by sorting agents into different groups, be they schools, communities, or product categories. This paper considers such a firm, which controls group entry by setting a series of anonymous prices. We show that private provision systematically leads to two distortions relative to the efficient solution: first, agents are segregated too finely; second, too many agents are excluded from all groups. We demonstrate that these distortions are a consequence of anonymous pricing and do not depend upon the nature of the peer effects. This general approach also allows us to assess the way the ‘returns to scale’ of peer technology and the cost of group formation affect the optimal group structure.
影响因子：
8.2
作者：
B. Moldovanu;A. Sela;Xianwen Shi
通讯作者：
B. Moldovanu;A. Sela;Xianwen Shi