The Importance of Government Commitment in Attracting Firms: A Dynamic Analysis of Tax Competition in an Agglomeration Economy
The Importance of Government Commitment in Attracting Firms: A Dynamic Analysis of Tax Competition in an Agglomeration Economy
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政府承诺在吸引企业方面的重要性：集聚经济中税收竞争的动态分析
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.2374674
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发表时间：
2014
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Hayato Kato
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Hayato Kato
工业企业的集聚倾向显著影响税收竞争的性质。本文分析了在一个具有贸易成本和国际移动的工业企业的经济中，两国在无限时间范围内的税收竞争。以往在“新经济地理学”框架下对税收竞争的研究大多采用静态模型。在这项研究中，两个政府动态地相互竞争，以吸引企业通过他们的税收和补贴的选择。这表明，政府的承诺，他们的政策是至关重要的，从长远来看，在决定企业的分布。具体而言，如果政府发现彼此的税收政策是可信的，那么当贸易成本低到足以使聚集力占主导地位时，一个国家将吸引所有的公司。如果政策不可信，即使贸易成本很低，两国也可能吸引同等份额的公司，因为政府缺乏承诺会成为分散力量。
Agglomeration tendencies of industrial firms significantly affect the nature of tax competition. This paper analyzes tax competition between two countries over an infinite time horizon in an economy with trade costs and internationally mobile industrial firms. Most of the previous studies on tax competition in the ‘new economic geography’ framework employ static models. In this study, two governments dynamically compete with each other to attract firms through their choices of taxes and subsidies. It is shown that the commitment of the governments to their policies is crucial in determining the distribution of firms in the long run. Specifically, if governments find each others׳ tax policies credible, then one country will attract all the firms when trade costs are low enough to make agglomeration forces dominant. If policies are not credible, both countries may attract an equal share of firms even when trade costs are low, as the lack of commitment by governments acts as a dispersion force.
DOI：
10.1111/1468-2354.t01-1-00021
发表时间：
2002-05
期刊：
Macroeconomics eJournal
影响因子：
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作者：
G. Ottaviano;T. Tabuchi;Jacques-François Thisse
通讯作者：
G. Ottaviano;T. Tabuchi;Jacques-François Thisse