Backing up, not backing down: Mitigating audience costs through policy substitution
Backing up, not backing down: Mitigating audience costs through policy substitution
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支持，而不是退缩：通过政策替代降低观众成本
DOI：
10.1177/0022343319832641
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发表时间：
2019
影响因子：
3.6
通讯作者：
Erik Lin
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Erik Lin
一位领导人能否通过选择“退回”一项不那么强硬的政策，来降低完全放弃威胁所带来的听众成本？目前的研究考察了发出威胁后又不采取任何行动的政治影响。然而，现实世界的领导人往往会“支持”并实施涉及某些行动的政策——例如，在威胁使用武力后实施制裁，而不是完全放弃。本文认为，听众成本可以通过政策替代来减轻：支持不那么强硬的政策——减少领导人言行之间的不一致——可能会降低听众成本。一系列原始的调查实验支持了这一论点，并表明人们将不一致视为一个连续体。研究结果对国内政治和危机谈判具有启示意义。在国内，与退让的领导人相比，支持的领导人面对的听众成本更低，而且被视为更有能力。然而，那些受到威胁的人不太可能相信一个以前支持或让步的外国领导人未来的威胁。因此，备份会降低危机信号的可信度，因为它使竞争对手难以区分可信的威胁和那些将被备份的威胁。
Can a leader reduce the audience costs imposed for backing down completely on a threat by opting instead to ‘back up’ to a less hawkish policy? Current research examines the political repercussions of making a threat and then taking no action at all. Real world leaders, however, often ‘back up’ and implement policies that involve some action – for instance, imposing sanctions after threatening military force, rather than backing down entirely. This article argues that audience costs can be mitigated through policy substitution: backing up to less hawkish policies – that reduce inconsistency between a leader’s words and deeds – may reduce audience costs. A series of original survey experiments finds support for the argument and demonstrates that the population treats inconsistency as a continuum. The findings have implications for domestic politics and crisis bargaining. Domestically, a leader who backs up faces lower audience costs and is seen as more competent than one who backs down. Yet those on the receiving end of threats are less likely to believe the future threats of a foreign leader who has previously backed up or backed down. Backing up therefore degrades the credibility of crisis signals by making it difficult for rivals to distinguish between credible threats and those that will be backed up.
英国公众的观众成本：升级、危机类型和首相言论的影响
影响因子：
2.6
作者：
Davies G
通讯作者：
Davies G