The Contribution of Social Norms to the Global Financial Crisis: A Systemic Actor Focused Model and Proposal for Regulatory Change
The Contribution of Social Norms to the Global Financial Crisis: A Systemic Actor Focused Model and Proposal for Regulatory Change
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社会规范对全球金融危机的贡献：以系统参与者为中心的模型和监管变革建议
DOI：
10.1111/j.1467-8683.2011.00883.x
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发表时间：
2011
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Scott D. Kiel
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
G. Nicholson;Scott D. Kiel
稿件类型：概念性。研究问题/议题：传统的金融体系监管改革侧重于自利理性行为者的标准经济假设。全球金融危机（GFC）和类似的金融失败凸显了这种方法的局限性。相反，我们使用基于规范（或软法律）的视角来研究全球金融危机背后的系统性问题，如何不那么多地存在于自我利益的新古典经济学假设中，而是存在于市场参与者中买方谨慎和评级机构依赖的规范所利用的不受约束的金融创新中。在整个行业薪酬实践的推动下，这些规范造成了信息不对称，从根本上破坏了市场的完整性。研究结果/见解：我们提出了一个模型，突出了投资银行作为专业服务公司如何向客户提供优质信息。这就产生了一个信息不对称的问题，在发展创新的金融交易时，他们可以利用买者自负的市场准则。我们提出了一个模型，强调有缺陷的金融创新如何导致评估和定价风险的广泛系统性问题，因为市场参与者可以积极发展和促进有缺陷的交易。在过度依赖信用评级机构的情况下（由于买家面临的高信息和搜索成本），以及在金融特殊目的实体中对董事受托责任的重视程度降低，这一问题就会加剧。理论/学术影响：支撑金融市场的社会规范是市场监管的核心。我们的方法对金融部门不同市场交易的普遍规范的使用进行了重新审视。研究人员需要探索社会规范和市场环境（如金融创新）之间的相互作用，以更好地理解金融市场的行为。我们认为，规范和市场机制之间的不匹配可能导致重大的意想不到的后果。我们将软法（规范）和硬法（监管）方法结合起来进行监管的方法，为机构、管理和制度理论提供了更多的见解。从业者/政策影响：监管机构需要了解规范和金融市场背景，以制定更好的立法干预措施。具体来说，区分金融市场中的交易类型将解决有缺陷的金融创新的购买者所面临的与信息和搜索成本相关的问题。我们还为政策制定者提供了建议，建议他们对金融体系中主要参与者的风险承担进行问责，以最大限度地减少大多数金融部门的市场扭曲。
Manuscript Type: Conceptual. Research Question/Issue: Conventional regulatory reforms of the financial system focus on standard economic assumptions of self‐interested, rational actors. The Global Financial Crisis (GFC) and similar financial failures highlight that there are limits to this approach. Instead we use a norm‐based (or soft law) perspective to examine how the systemic problems underlying the GFC lay not so much in neo‐classical economic assumptions of self‐interest, but in unchecked financial innovation exploited by norms of buyer beware and ratings agency reliance among market participants. Fueled by sector‐wide remuneration practices, these norms created information asymmetries that fundamentally undermined the integrity of the market. Research Findings/Insights: We present a model that highlights how investment banks, as professional service firms, have superior information to their clients. This presents an information asymmetry problem whereby they can exploit the market norm of caveat emptor (buyer beware) when developing innovative financial transactions. We propose a model highlighting how flawed financial innovation can lead to widespread, systemic problems of assessing and pricing risk because market participants can actively develop and promote flawed transactions. This problem is exacerbated where there is an over‐reliance on credit ratings agencies (due to the high information and search costs facing buyers) and a reduced emphasis on director fiduciary duties in financial Special Purpose Entities. Theoretical/Academic Implications: Social norms that underpin financial markets are central to market regulation. Our approach provides a re‐examination of the often unquestioned use of universal norms for differing market transactions in the financial sector. Researchers need to explore the interaction between social norms and market contexts (such as financial innovation) to better understand the behavior of financial markets. We contend that a mismatch between norms and market mechanisms can lead to significant unintended outcomes. Our approach of combining soft law (norms) and hard law (regulation) approaches to regulation provides added insights into agency, stewardship, and institutional theories. Practitioner/Policy Implications: Regulators need to understand norms and financial market contexts to develop better legislative interventions. Specifically, differentiating between transaction types in financial markets will address the problems associated with information and search costs facing buyers of flawed financial innovation. We also provide proposals for policy makers seeking to embed accountability for risk taking across the key participants in the financial system to minimize market distortions in the majority of the financial sector.
影响因子：
158.5
作者：
Christakis, Nicholas A.;Fowler, James H.
通讯作者：
Fowler, James H.