Asymmetric Partisan Voter Turnout Games.

Asymmetric Partisan Voter Turnout Games.
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DOI:
10.1007/s13235-021-00384-1
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发表时间:
2021
影响因子:
1.5
通讯作者:
Fu F
Fu F
中科院分区:
数学4区
文献类型:
--
作者:
Guage C;Fu F

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自从唐斯在1957年提出投票行为是非理性的以来,无数的模型被提出来解释投票和解释观察到的投票率模式。我们提出了一个模型,在该模型中,党派考虑他们的投票时,决定是否在选举中弃权的工具和表达的好处,引入了大多数其他模型不考虑的不对称。允许我们的选民的学习过程中,我们分析了什么样的进化稳定的策略是合理的在各种条件下。在不同的选民规模,选民的党派分裂,以及选民在多大程度上考虑其收益结构中的劣势因素时,我们发现不同的均衡出现。我们的模型预测的比较静态是一致的选民的行为,特别是肯定了“规模效应”,即投票率下降,选民规模的增加。此外,放宽我们的一些初步假设,消除了我们的模型和经验选民行为之间的一些差异的预测。特别是,我们的工作表明,对选民党派分裂的误解可能会导致高投票率行为。在线版补充材料可通过10.1007/s13235-021-00384-1获得。
Since Downs proposed that the act of voting is irrational in 1957, myriad models have been proposed to explain voting and account for observed turnout patterns. We propose a model in which partisans consider both the instrumental and expressive benefits of their vote when deciding whether or not to abstain in an election, introducing an asymmetry that most other models do not consider. Allowing learning processes within our electorate, we analyze what evolutionarily stable strategies are rationalizable under various conditions. Upon varying electorate size, the partisan split of the electorate, and the degree to which an electorate takes underdog considerations into account in its payoff structure, we find that different equilibria arise. Our model predicts comparative statics that are consistent with voter behavior, specifically affirming a “size effect,” in which turnout decreases as electorate size increases. Furthermore, relaxing some of our preliminary assumptions eliminates some of the discrepancies between the predictions of our model and empirical voter behavior. In particular, our work demonstrates that misperceptions about the partisan split of an electorate may account for high turnout behavior . The online version supplementary material available at 10.1007/s13235-021-00384-1.
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