Tax Shelters, Reputational Costs and CEO Turnover: Evidence from Tax-Violating Enterprises in China
Tax Shelters, Reputational Costs and CEO Turnover: Evidence from Tax-Violating Enterprises in China
复制标题
避税、声誉成本和CEO更替：来自中国违法企业的证据
DOI：
10.1080/1540496x.2020.1768070
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发表时间：
2020
影响因子：
4
通讯作者：
Yin Yu
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Na Wang;Liangliang Wang;Lirong Zhang;Yin Yu
摘要 本文调查了高管人员是否会因在不同所有权结构内使用避税措施而承担声誉成本。基于中国上市公司的税务违法事件，我们发现，国有企业的CEO比非国有企业的CEO更容易承担声誉成本，而且对高管的处罚总是发生在当年，而不是次年。此外，避税的个人声誉成本与税收侵略性和监管惩罚有关。税收侵略性或监管处罚越严厉，国有企业首席执行官避税的声誉成本就越大。我们的研究结果不仅为代理框架下企业避税声誉成本的研究提供了直接的实证证据，而且对于理解“庇护不足之谜”也具有重要意义。
ABSTRACT This paper investigates whether executives will bear reputational costs as a result of using tax shelters within different ownership structures. Based on tax-violation events of Chinese listed firms, we find that CEOs in state-owned enterprises are more likely to bear reputational costs than CEOs in non-state-owned enterprises and that the penalty on executives always occurs in the current year rather than in the subsequent year. In addition, the individual reputational cost of tax avoidance is related to tax aggressiveness and regulatory punishment. The more severe the tax aggressiveness or the regulatory punishment is, the greater the reputational cost of tax avoidance is for CEOs in SOEs. Our findings not only provide direct empirical evidence for the research on the corporate reputational costs of tax avoidance in an agency framework, but they also have great significance for understanding “the Under-Sheltering Puzzle.”
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.485403
发表时间：
2004-10
期刊：
Financial Accounting
影响因子：
--
作者：
D. Farber
通讯作者：
D. Farber