Coordination of verification activities with incentives: a two-firm model

Coordination of verification activities with incentives: a two-firm model
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验证活动与激励措施的协调:两家公司模型

DOI:
10.1007/s00163-020-00352-7
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发表时间:
2020
影响因子:
3.2
通讯作者:
Salado, Alejandro
Salado, Alejandro
中科院分区:
工程技术2区
文献类型:
--
作者:
Kulkarni, Aditya U.;Wernz, Christian;Salado, Alejandro

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在系统工程中,验证活动评估开发中的系统满足其需求的程度。在大型系统工程项目中,多个公司参与系统开发,因此必须协调核查活动。自利阻碍了对所有公司都有利的核查战略的实施,而鼓励每个公司选择对自己有利的核查战略。对核查活动的奖励可以促使单个公司采取有利于项目中所有公司的核查战略,但必须审慎地提供这些奖励,以尽量减少不必要的支出,防止滥用善意。在本文中,我们使用博弈论建模的承包商,分包商的情况下,分包商提供了一个组件的承包商,谁进一步将其集成到他们的系统。我们的模型使用置信分布来捕获每个公司在验证之前对其组件状态的认识不确定性,并且我们使用多尺度决策理论来建模承包商和分包商设计之间的相互依赖性。我们提出了一个激励机制,对齐的两家公司的验证策略,并使用我们的博弈论模型,我们确定这些情况下,承包商受益于激励分包商的验证活动。
In systems engineering, verification activities evaluate the extent to which a system under development satisfies its requirements. In large systems engineering projects, multiple firms are involved in the system development, and hence verification activities must be coordinated. Self-interest impedes the implementation of verification strategies that are beneficial for all firms while encouraging each firm to choose a verification strategy beneficial to itself. Incentives for verification activities can motivate a single firm to adopt verification strategies beneficial to all firms in the project, but these incentives must be offered judiciously to minimize unnecessary expenditures and prevent the abuse of goodwill. In this paper, we use game theory to model a contractor-subcontractor scenario, in which the subcontractor provides a component to the contractor, who further integrates it into their system. Our model uses belief distributions to capture each firm’s epistemic uncertainty in their component’s state prior to verification, and we use multiscale decision theory to model interdependencies between the contractor and subcontractor’s design. We propose an incentive mechanism that aligns the verification strategies of the two firms and using our game-theoretic model, we identify those scenarios where the contractor benefits from incentivizing the subcontractor’s verification activities.
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