Social networks and wages in Senegal’s labor market
Social networks and wages in Senegal’s labor market
复制标题
塞内加尔劳动力市场的社交网络和工资
DOI：
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发表时间：
2013
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
N. Berardi
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
N. Berardi
我们开发了一个理论框架，认为道德风险和网络和文化的多样性在招聘渠道的选择所发挥的作用。在偏袒的情况下，社交网络，特别是强关系，被用作非技术性工作的招聘渠道，并导致工资处罚，而其他情况则相反。我们估计了塞内加尔制造业正规部门的内生转换模型，并发现，与我们在偏袒情况下的理论预测一致，非正规招聘渠道更倾向于填补非技术职位空缺，并与工资惩罚相关，特别是当联系更强时。JEL ClassificationO 12; J31
We develop a theoretical framework that considers the role played by moral hazard and the diversity of networks and cultures in the choice of hiring channel. In favoritism contexts social networks, and particularly strong ties, are adopted as hiring channels for unskilled jobs and result in wage penalties, while otherwise the opposite happens. We estimate an endogenous switching model for the case of Senegal’s manufacturing formal sector and find, consistently with our theoretical predictions in case of favoritism, that informal hiring channels are preferred to fill unskilled vacancies and are associated with a wage penalty, especially when ties are stronger.JEL ClassificationO12; J31
推荐和工作绩效：来自加纳殖民军的证据
影响因子：
2
作者：
Marcel Fafchamps
通讯作者：
Marcel Fafchamps