Interdependent Public Projects
Interdependent Public Projects
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相互依存的公共项目
DOI：
10.1137/1.9781611977554.ch18
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发表时间：
2022
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Inbal Talgam
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Avi Cohen;M. Feldman;Divyarthi Mohan;Inbal Talgam
在Milgrom和Weber[1982]引入的相互依赖价值（IDV）模型中，代理具有私有信号，这些信号捕获了他们关于不同社会选择的信息，并且每个代理的估值是所有代理信号的函数。虽然相互依赖主要是在拍卖中研究的，但它与各种各样的社会选择环境（包括公共项目的规范环境）极其相关。相对于标准的独立私有价值，IDV模型是非常具有挑战性的，福利保障是通过两种替代条件实现的，即{\em信号的}单交叉{\em和亚模块性（SOS）}。无论是哪一种情况，现有的理论都无法解决公共项目设置问题。我们的贡献是双重的：(i)我们对IDV公共项目的真实性给出了一个可行的表征，对于存在这种表征的最大类别的估值，并将这类估值称为\emph{可分解估值}；（ii）我们提供了基于SOS估值的公共项目福利近似的可能性和不可能性结果。我们的主要不可能结果是，与拍卖相比，没有一种普遍真实的机制比随机选择一个项目更适合SOS估值的公共项目。我们的主要积极结果适用于SOS的{\em可排除}公共项目，为此我们建立了类似于拍卖的常数因子近似。我们的研究结果表明，在IDV模型中，排斥可能是实现福利保障的关键工具。
In the interdependent values (IDV) model introduced by Milgrom and Weber [1982], agents have private signals that capture their information about different social alternatives, and the valuation of every agent is a function of all agent signals. While interdependence has been mainly studied for auctions, it is extremely relevant for a large variety of social choice settings, including the canonical setting of public projects. The IDV model is very challenging relative to standard independent private values, and welfare guarantees have been achieved through two alternative conditions known as {\em single-crossing} and {\em submodularity over signals (SOS)}. In either case, the existing theory falls short of solving the public projects setting. Our contribution is twofold: (i) We give a workable characterization of truthfulness for IDV public projects for the largest class of valuations for which such a characterization exists, and term this class \emph{decomposable valuations}; (ii) We provide possibility and impossibility results for welfare approximation in public projects with SOS valuations. Our main impossibility result is that, in contrast to auctions, no universally truthful mechanism performs better for public projects with SOS valuations than choosing a project at random. Our main positive result applies to {\em excludable} public projects with SOS, for which we establish a constant factor approximation similar to auctions. Our results suggest that exclusion may be a key tool for achieving welfare guarantees in the IDV model.
DOI：
10.1145/3328526.3329759
发表时间：
2019-03
期刊：
Proceedings of the 2019 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation
影响因子：
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作者：
Alon Eden;M. Feldman;A. Fiat;Kira Goldner;Anna R. Karlin
通讯作者：
Alon Eden;M. Feldman;A. Fiat;Kira Goldner;Anna R. Karlin
事后实施的局限性
影响因子：
6.1
作者：
Jehiel;Philippe;Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehn;Benny Moldovanu;William R. Zame
通讯作者：
William R. Zame