Believing on Authority
Believing on Authority
复制标题
相信权威
DOI:
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发表时间:
2014
期刊:
影响因子:
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通讯作者:
Matthew A. Benton
中科院分区:
文献类型:
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作者:
Matthew A. Benton
Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski’s Epistemic Authority () is a welcome exploration of the relationships between, on the one hand, the so-called “cognitive” notions associated with epistemology (particularly knowledge, belief, justification, reflection, and rationality), and on the other, the commonly classified “affective” notions of trust, desire, emotion, and reliance. In particular, she argues that the connection between them arises from our recognized dependence, both practically and rationally, upon epistemic authority, whether that authority resides in our own cognitive faculties or emotions, or in others’ faculties and expertise. Such epistemic authority applies not only to mundane empirical matters such as our immediate natural environment, but also to the domains of morality and religion. There is much to commend in this book. Zagzebski’s treatment of these issues is thorough, and admirable for its broad vision of uniting social epistemology with topics in moral and political philosophy as well as philosophy of religion. Here I will concentrate on three main topics. In § I present some challenges for Zagzebski’s view of rationality as it relates to self-trust; in § I consider how her view of authority relates to some issues of epistemic authority in testimony; and in § I raise some difficulties for her treatment of epistemic authority as it relates to religious epistemology.
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199672158.003.0009
发表时间:
2014
期刊:
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影响因子:
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作者:
Fricker E
通讯作者:
Fricker E