Religious Faith and Intellectual Virtue
Religious Faith and Intellectual Virtue
复制标题
宗教信仰与知识美德
DOI：
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199672158.003.0009
复制
发表时间：
2014
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Fricker E
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Fricker E
对某些人来说，宗教信仰和信念可能部分是通过个人的宗教经历获得和维持的。但对许多人来说，通往宗教信仰（或无神论）的道路可能主要是通过接受他们周围被视为权威的其他人的明确教义，同时默许，接受他们成长的社区中对形而上学和宗教事务的主导观点。可以说，这些信念在被纳入个人的框架世界观之前，可能没有经过有意识的理性审查，就从侧门溜了进来。一旦世界观的一部分，他们然后塑造doxastic响应其他特定位的证据，来到个人的方式-在某些情况下，工作，以延续世界观，并隔离它对什么其他人可能会看到作为反证它。1这是如此，以下问题是核心的认识论宗教信仰：如果有的话，什么时候才是认知上允许的或强制性的，让一个人把另一个人持有某种信仰的事实作为自己采纳它的理由？我将研究一个对这个问题至关重要的观点。当一个人把另一个人的信念看作是表面上合理的时候，一个人就把认识上的信任放在另一个人身上，也就是说，一个人把她持有某种信念的事实，比如说P，作为P的真理的表面证据，并形成这样的信念：
Religious belief and faith for some may be acquired and sustained in part by individual religious experience. but for many the route to religious belief (or to atheism) may be primarily through accepting the explicit teachings of others around them treated as authoritative, at the same time as acquiescing in, taking on board, the predominant views on metaphysical and religious matters in the community in which they grow up. These beliefs may, as it were, slip in through the side-door without being subjected to conscious rational scrutiny before being incorporated into the individual’s framing world view. Once part of that world view, they then shape the doxastic response to other particular bits of evidence that come the individual’s way—in some cases, working to perpetuate the world view, and insulate it against what some others might see as counter-evidence to it. 1This being so, the following issue is central to the epistemology of religious belief: when, if ever, is it epistemically permissible or mandatory for one to take the fact that another holds a certain belief as grounds to adopt it oneself? I will examine an idea that is crucial to this question. One places epistemic trust in another, when one treats her beliefs as prima facie credible—that is, one takes the fact that she holds a certain belief, say P, as prima facie evidence of the truth of P, and forms belief that P
对（几乎）同等权重观点的辩护
DOI：
--
发表时间：
2013
期刊：
影响因子：
--
作者：
Stewart M Cohen
通讯作者：
Stewart M Cohen
认知概念是否可以还原为伦理概念
DOI：
--
发表时间：
1978
期刊：
影响因子：
--
作者：
R. Firth
通讯作者：
R. Firth
影响因子：
2.1
作者：
Elga, Adam
通讯作者：
Elga, Adam