Stock-Related Compensation and Product-Market Competition
Stock-Related Compensation and Product-Market Competition
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股票相关薪酬和产品市场竞争
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.163138
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发表时间：
1999
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
G. Spagnolo
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
G. Spagnolo
我表明，只要股票市场具有完美的预见性，利润作为股息进行分配，激励措施不止一次支付或延期支付，与股票相关的薪酬方案是管理人员在重复寡头垄断中支持默契共谋协议的强烈激励。股票市场预期惩罚阶段的损失，并在股票价格上打折，减少经理人从任何偏离中获得的短期收益。当延迟时，与股票相关的激励可能会消除所有经理人从偏离中获得的短期收益，从而使合谋在任何折扣因子下都是可支持的。结果适用于任何长度的管理合同。
I show that as long as the stock market has perfect foresight, profits are distributed as dividends, and incentives are paid more than once or are deferred, stock-related compensation packages are strong incentives for managers to support tacit collusive agreements in repeated oligopolies. The stock market anticipates the losses from punishment phases and discounts them on stock prices, reducing managers' short-run gains from any deviation. When deferred, stock-related incentives may remove all managers' short-run gains from deviation, making collusion supportable at any discount factor. The results hold with managerial contracts of any length.
DOI：
--
发表时间：
1986-06
期刊：
The American Economic Review
影响因子：
--
作者：
J. Rotemberg;Garth Saloner
通讯作者：
J. Rotemberg;Garth Saloner
影响因子：
6.1
作者：
ABREU, D
通讯作者：
ABREU, D