Metarepresentation in linguistic communication
Metarepresentation in linguistic communication
复制标题
语言交流中的元表征
DOI：
--
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发表时间：
2000
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Deirdre Wilson
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Deirdre Wilson
©Deirdre Wilson和Dan Sperber 2012。元表征研究的几个分支对语言交际的研究有一定的影响。总的来说，它们之间的互动很少，而且将它们与经验上似是而非的语用理论相结合的可能性也没有得到太多的探索。本章有两个主要目的：说明在语言交际中运用的元表征能力的深度和多样性，并论证这些能力的语用解释既可以从更一般的元表征能力的研究中受益，也可以为研究提供有用的证据。元表示是表示的表示：一个高阶表示嵌入了一个低阶表示。对语言交际研究有影响的元表征研究的不同分支在所涉及的元表征类型和它们的使用上有所不同。首先，有关于读心术（或“心智理论”）的哲学和心理学文献，它涉及对归因于思想形成思想的能力（Whiten 1991; Davies and Stone 1995a, 1995b; Carruthers and Smith 1996）。假设一个孩子看到一个球被放进一个盒子里。在形成了(1)的思想之后，他可以继续，通过观察他的同伴，形成(2)类型的思想：球在盒子里。现在有大量的工作是关于这种心理能力是如何发展的，以及它是如何崩溃的。它可能不同程度地存在。例如，人们将与自己不一致的信念归因于他人的能力可能会有所不同。一个相信(1)而缺乏这种能力的孩子将被限制在（2a）和（2c）中的元描述中。具有一阶“心智理论”的孩子可以将与自己不同的信念归因于他人（如（2b））；而拥有二阶“心智理论”的人则可以将他人对他人信念的看法与自己的看法不同（如（2d）） （Leslie 1987; Astington, Harris and Olson 1988; Frye and Moore 1991; Fodor 1992; Gopnik and Wellman 1992; Lewis and Mitchell 1994; Smith and Tsimpli 1995; Scholl and Leslie 1999）。自闭症患者通常被认为缺乏这种类型的一级或二级元心理能力（Baron-Cohen, Leslie and Frith 1985; Leslie 1991; Baron-Cohen, Tager-Flusberg and Cohen 1993; Happe 1993, 1994; Baron-Cohen 1995）。
© Deirdre Wilson and Dan Sperber 2012. Introduction Several strands of research on metarepresentation have a bearing on the study of linguistic communication. On the whole, there has been little interaction among them, and the possibility of integrating them with an empirically plausible pragmatic theory has not been much explored. This chapter has two main aims: to illustrate the depth and variety of metarepresentational abilities deployed in linguistic communication, and to argue that a pragmatic account of these abilities can both benefit from and provide useful evidence for the study of more general metarepresentational abilities. A metarepresentation is a representation of a representation: a higher-order representation with a lower-order representation embedded within it. The different strands of research on metarepresentation that have a bearing on the study of linguistic communication vary in the type of metarepresentations involved and the use to which they are put. First, there is the philosophical and psychological literature on mindreading (or ‘theory of mind’), which deals with the ability to form thoughts about attributed thoughts (Whiten 1991; Davies and Stone 1995a, 1995b; Carruthers and Smith 1996). Suppose a child sees a ball being put into a box. Having formed the thought in (1), he might go on, by observing his companions, to form thoughts of the type in (2): The ball is in the box. There is a now a substantial body of work on how this metapsychological ability develops and how it can break down. It may be present to varying degrees. People may differ, for example, in their ability to attribute to others beliefs incompatible with their own. A child who believes (1) and lacks this ability would be limited to the metarepresentations in (2a) and (2c). A child with first-order ‘theory of mind’ could attribute to others beliefs that differ from his own (as in (2b)); and one with second-order ‘theory of mind’ could attribute to others beliefs about the beliefs of others which differ from his own (as in (2d)) (Leslie 1987; Astington, Harris and Olson 1988; Frye and Moore 1991; Fodor 1992; Gopnik and Wellman 1992; Lewis and Mitchell 1994; Smith and Tsimpli 1995; Scholl and Leslie 1999). People with autism are typically said to be lacking in first- or second-order metapsychological abilities of this type (Baron-Cohen, Leslie and Frith 1985; Leslie 1991; Baron-Cohen, Tager-Flusberg and Cohen 1993; Happe 1993, 1994; Baron-Cohen 1995).
再来一块馅饼怎么样：话语反讽的暗示假装理论。
DOI：
10.1037//0096-3445.124.1.3
发表时间：
1995
期刊：
Journal of experimental psychology. General.
影响因子：
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作者：
Kumon-Nakamura,S;Glucksberg,S;Brown,M
通讯作者：
Brown,M